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ABSTRACT
Li, Zhang PhD, Purdue University, May 2016. Optimal Monitoring and Mitigation
of Systemic Risk in Lending Networks. Major Professors: Ilya Pollak and Borja
Peleato.
This thesis proposes optimal policies to manage systemic risk in financial networks.
Given a one-period borrower-lender network in which all debts are due at the same
time and have the same seniority, we address the problem of allocating a fixed amount
of cash among the nodes to minimize the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities. Assum-
ing all the loan amounts and cash flows are fixed and that there are no bankruptcy
costs, we show that this problem is equivalent to a linear program. We develop a
duality-based distributed algorithm to solve it which is useful for applications where
it is desirable to avoid centralized data gathering and computation. Since some appli-
cations require forecasting and planning for a wide variety of different contingencies,
we introduce a stochastic model for the institutions operating cash and consider the
problem of minimizing the expectation of the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities. We
show that this problem is a two-stage stochastic linear program and develop an online
learning algorithm based on stochastic gradient descent to solve it. We consider a
number of further extensions of our deterministic scenario by incorporating various
additional features of real-world lending networks into our model. For example, we
show that if the defaulting nodes do not pay anything, then the optimal cash injec-
tion allocation problem is a mixed-integer linear program. In addition, we develop
and evaluate two heuristic algorithms to allocate the cash injection amount so as to
minimize the number of nodes in default. Our results provide algorithmic tools to
help financial institutions, banking supervisory authorities, regulatory agencies, and
clearing houses in monitoring and mitigating systemic risk in financial networks.
11. OPTIMAL MONITORING AND MITIGATION OF
SYSTEMIC RISK IN FINANCIAL NETWORKS UNDER
THE DETERMINISTIC MODEL
1.1 Introduction
The events of the last several years revealed an acute need for tools to system-
atically model, analyze, monitor, and control large financial networks. Motivated by
this need, we propose to address the problem of optimizing the amount and structure
of liquidity assistance in a distressed financial network, under a variety of modeling
assumptions and implementation scenarios.
Two broad applications motivate our work: day-to-day monitoring of financial
systems and decision making during an imminent crisis. Examples of the latter in-
clude the decision in September 1998 by a group of financial institutions to rescue
Long-Term Capital Management, and the decisions by the Treasury and the Fed in
September 2008 to rescue AIG and to let Lehman Brothers fail. The deliberations
leading to these and other similar actions have been extensively covered in the press.
These reports suggest that the decision making processes could have benefited from
quantitative methods for analyzing potential policies and their likely outcomes. In
addition, such methods could help avoid systemic crises in the first place, by inform-
ing day-to-day actions of financial institutions, regulators, supervisory authorities,
and legislative bodies.
Given a financial network model, we are interested in addressing the following
problem.
Problem I: Allocate a fixed amount of cash assistance among the nodes in a
financial network in order to minimize the (possibly weighted) sum of unpaid
liabilities in the system.
2An alternative formulation of the same problem, is to both select the amount of
injected cash and determine how to distribute it among the nodes in order to minimize
the overall cost equal to a linear combination of the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities
and the amount of injected cash.
We consider a static model with a single maturity date, and with a known network
structure. We assume that we know both the amounts owed by every node in the
network to every other node, and the net asset amounts available to every node from
sources external to the network. Even for this relatively simple model, Problem I is far
from straightforward, because of a nonlinear relationship between the cash injection
amounts and the loan repayment amounts. Building upon the results from [1], we
construct algorithms for computing exact solutions for Problem I and its alternative
variant, by showing in Section 1.3 that both formulations are equivalent to linear
programs under a proportional payment scheme, such as the one assumed in [1].
We consider a number of extensions of our model by adding to it various features
that characterize real-world lending networks. In Section 1.4, we allow the obligations
in the network to have multiple seniorities, so that a node may only satisfy a liability
once it fully repays all of its more senior liabilities. Within each seniority, we still
assume the same proportional payment scheme as in [1]. We show that in this case,
Problem I is an NP-hard mixed-integer linear program. However, we show through
simulations that use optimization package CVX [2,3] that this problem can be accu-
rately solved in a few seconds on a personal computer for a network size comparable
to the size of the US banking network.
In Section 1.5, we incorporate credit default swaps (CDSs) into our model: any
node in the network can now sell a CDS to any other node that insures the latter
against the default of one of its borrowers. In this case, we show that simultaneous
bilateral clearing assumed in [1] does not necessarily guarantee the existence of a
solution even for very simple networks with loops. We instead adopt a three-round
clearing scheme: first, the payments on the underlying obligations are cleared; the
second round consists of the payments from the CDSs triggered by the first-round
3defaults; and in the third round additional payments can be made on the underlying
obligations. We show that under this scheme, Problem I is also a mixed-integer linear
program that can be efficiently solved for networks of relevant sizes.
We show in Section 1.8 that under the all-or-nothing payment scheme where the
defaulting nodes do not pay at all, Problem I is also a mixed-integer linear program
which can be accurately and efficiently solved.
We also consider another problem where the objective is to minimize the number
of defaulting nodes rather than the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities:
Problem II: Allocate a fixed amount of cash assistance among the nodes in a
financial network in order to minimize the number of nodes in default.
For Problem II, we develop two heuristic algorithms in Section 1.6: a reweighted
ℓ1 minimization approach inspired by [4] and a greedy algorithm. We illustrate our
algorithms using examples with synthetic data for which the optimal solution can be
calculated exactly. We show through numerical simulations that the solutions calcu-
lated by the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm are close to optimal, and that the performance of
the greedy algorithm highly depends on the network topology. We also compare these
two algorithms using three types of random networks for which the optimal solution
is not available. In one of these three examples the performance of these two algo-
rithms is statistically indistinguishable; in the second example the greedy algorithm
outperforms reweighted ℓ1 minimization; and in the third example the reweighted ℓ1
minimization algorithm outperforms the greedy approach.
While Problem II is unlikely to be of direct practical importance (indeed, it is
difficult to imagine a situation where a regulator would consider the failures of a small
local bank and Citi to be equally bad), it serves as a stepping stone to a more practical
and more difficult scenario where the optimization objective is a linear combination
of the weighted unpaid liabilities (as in Problem I) and the sum of weights over the
defaulted nodes (an extension of Problem II).
4Problem III: Given a fixed amount of cash to be injected into the system,
we consider an objective function which is a linear combination of the sum of
weights over the defaulted nodes and the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities.
We show in Section 1.7 that this problem is equivalent to a mixed-integer linear
program.
1.1.1 Related Literature
Contagion in financial networks has been frequently studied in the past, especially
after the financial crisis in 2007-2008. Notable examples of network topology analysis
based on real data are [5–8]. Real data informs the new approaches for assessing
systemic financial stability of banking systems developed in [9–22].
Often, systemic failures are caused by an epidemic of defaults whereby a group of
nodes unable to meet their obligations trigger the insolvency of their lenders, leading
to the defaults of lenders’ lenders, etc, until this spread of defaults infects a large
part of the system. For this reason, many studies have been devoted to discovering
network structures conducive to default contagion [23–29]. The relationships between
the probability of a systemic failure and the average connectivity in the network are
investigated in [23, 26, 29]. Other features, such as as the distribution of degrees and
the structure of the subgraphs of contagious links, are examined in [27].
While potentially useful in policymaking, most of these references do not provide
specific policy recipes. One strand of literature on quantitative models for optimizing
policy decisions has focused on analyzing the efficacy of bailouts and understanding
the behavior of firms in response to bailouts. To this end, game-theoretic models are
proposed in [30] and [31] that have two agents: the government and a single private
sector entity. The focus of another set of research efforts has been on the setting of
capital and liquidity requirements [24, 32–34] in order to reduce systemic risk.
Our work contributes to the literature by taking a network-level view of optimal
policies and proposing optimal cash injection strategies for networks in distress. This
5chapter extends our earlier work reported in [35–37]. In addition to ours, several other
papers have recently considered cash injection policies for lending networks [38–44],
all based on the framework proposed in [1].
Under the proportional payment mechanism presented in [1], the problem of de-
termining the clearing vector is formulated as a linear program in [38]. Two systemic
risk measures are obtained by considering the associated dual problem of the linear
program: Contagion Risk Indicator and Funding Risk Indicator. Furthermore [38]
develops optimal bailout strategies for two objectives: minimizing the total amount
of cash injection given a constraint on the weighted number of defaults and mini-
mizing the weighted number of defaults given a budget of cash injection. It is shown
in [38] that both these problems are mixed-integer linear programs. Our work on pro-
portional payment scheme is also based on the linear program formulation extended
from [1]. Our objective in Problem I is minimizing the weighted sum of unpaid lia-
bilities, which is different from any objectives in [38]. Our problem II also aims to
minimize the number of defaults. But instead of formulating it as a MILP, which is
hard to solve for large networks, we propose two scalable heuristic algorithms. Beside
the proportional payment scheme in [38], we also consider problem II with the all-
or-nothing payment scheme. We adapt the model with multiple seniorities in [38] to
our Problem I. For the model with CDS, there exists an issue in [38]: the one-period
simultaneous clearing model in [1] cannot be simply extended to the one with CDS
since simultaneous bilateral clearing does not necessarily guarantee the existence of
a solution even for very simple networks with loops. In our work, we circumvent this
issue with a three-round clearing scheme.
A cash injection targeting policy is developed in [39–41] for an infinitesimally small
amount of injected cash. The basic idea of the policy is to inject the cash into the
node with the largest “threat index” which is the same as the funding risk indicator
from [38]. This targeting policy is optimal when the amount of the injected cash is
small enough to keep the set of defaulting nodes unchanged. However, as pointed
out in [41], the targeting policy is not monotone in the cash injection amount, and
6therefore this algorithm cannot be easily extended to non-infinitesimal cash injection
amounts.
In [42, 43], bankruptcy costs are incorporated into the model of [1]. The main
contribution of that work is showing that because of the bankruptcy costs, it is
sometimes beneficial for some solvent banks to form bailout consortia and rescue
failing banks. However, it may happen that the solvent banks do not have enough
means to effect a bailout, and in this case external intervention may still be needed.
A multi-period stochastic clearing framework based on [1] is proposed in [44],
where a lender of last resort monitors the network and may provide liquidity assistance
loans to failing nodes. The paper proposes several strategies that the lender of last
resort might follow in making its decisions. One of these strategies, the so-called
max-liquidity policy, aims to solve our Problem I during each period. However, [44]
does not describe an algorithm for solving this problem.
Another related work is [45]. Based on the clearing payment framework in [1], the
authors of [45] study the probability of contagion and amplification of losses due to
network effects when the system suffers a random shock.
1.1.2 Outline of this chapter
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model of financial
networks, the clearing payment mechanism, and the notation. Section 1.3 shows that
if each defaulting node pays its creditors in proportion to the owed amounts, then
Problem I and its alternative formulation are equivalent to linear programs. Sec-
tion 1.4 investigates the model with multiple seniorities and Section 1.5 incorporates
CDS in the model. Two heuristic algorithms are developed in Section 1.6 to solve
Problem II under the proportional payment mechanism: a reweighted ℓ1 minimiza-
tion algorithm and a greedy algorithm. Problem III is considered in Section 1.7.
Section 1.8 analyzes Problem I under the assumption that the defaulting nodes do
not pay anything. We prove that it is then an NP-hard mixed-integer linear pro-
7Table 1.1.




e ≥ 0 net external assets at node i before cash injection
c ≥ 0 external cash injection to node i
p¯ the amount node i owes to all its creditors
p ≤ p¯ the total amount node i actually repays all its creditors on the due date
of the loans
p¯− p node i’s total unpaid liabilities
r remaining cash of node i after clearing payment
w the weight of $1 of unpaid liability at node i
v the weight of node i’s default
d indicator variable of whether node i defaults, i.e., di = 1 if node i
defaults; di = 0 otherwise
gram and show that can be efficiently solved using modern optimization software for
network sizes comparable to the size of the US banking system.
1.2 Model and Notation
Our network model is a directed graph with N nodes where a directed edge from
node i to node j with weight Lij > 0 signifies that i owes $Lij to j. This is a one-
period model with no dynamics—i.e., we assume that all the loans are due on the
same date and all the payments occur on that date. We use the following notation:
• any inequality whose both sides are vectors is component-wise;
8• 0, 1, e, c, p¯, p, r, w, v, and d are all vectors in RN defined in Table 1.1;
• W = wT (p¯− p) is the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities in the system;
• Nd is the number of nodes in default, i.e., the number of nodes i whose payments
are below their liabilities, pi < p¯i;







if p¯i 6= 0,
0 otherwise;
• Π and L are the matrices whose entries are Πij and Lij , respectively.
Given the above financial system, we consider the proportional payment mech-
anism and the all-or-nothing payment mechanism. The latter can be alternatively
interpreted as the proportional payment mechanism with 100% bankruptcy costs. As
proposed in [1], the proportional payment mechanism without bankruptcy costs is
defined as follows.
Proportional payment mechanism with no bankruptcy costs:




then all i’s creditors get paid in full.
• If i’s total funds are smaller than its liabilities, then i pays all its funds to its
creditors.
• All i’s debts have the same seniority. This means that, if i’s liabilities exceed its
total funds then each creditor gets paid in proportion to what it is owed. This
guarantees that the amount actually received by node j from node i is always





9Under these assumptions, a node will pay all the available funds proportionally to its
creditors, up to the amount of its liabilities. The payment vector can lie anywhere in
the rectangle [0, p¯]. Under the all-or-nothing payment scenario, the defaulting nodes
do not pay at all, so each component i of the payment vector is either 0 or p¯i
All-or-nothing payment mechanism:
• If i’s total funds are at least as large as its liabilities, then all i’s creditors get
paid in full.
• If i’s total funds are smaller than its liabilities, then i pays nothing.
As defined in [1], a clearing payment vector p is a vector of borrower-to-lender
payments that is consistent with the conditions of the payment mechanism.
In this chapter, we are mostly concerned with Problems I and II under the pro-
portional payment scenario with no bankruptcy costs. We also prove that the all-
or-nothing payment scenario makes Problem I NP-hard. In this case, Problem I can
be formulated as a mixed-integer linear program that can be efficiently solved on a
personal computer using modern optimization software for network sizes comparable
to the size of the US banking system.
1.3 Optimal Solution
Consider a network with a known structure of liabilities L and a known vector e
of net assets before cash injection. Using the notation established in the preceding
section, Problem I seeks a cash injection allocation vector c ≥ 0 to minimize the
following weighted sum of unpaid liabilities,
W = wT (p¯− p),




In this section, we assume proportional payments with no bankruptcy costs. We first
prove that, for any cash injection vector c, there exists a unique clearing payment
vector that minimizes the cost W .
Lemma 1 Given a financial system (Π, p¯, e), a cash injection vector c and a weight
vector w > 0, there exists a unique clearing payment vector p minimizing the weighted
sum W = wT (p¯− p).
Proof First, note that since w and p¯ do not depend on p or c, minimizing W is
equivalent to maximizing wTp. With a fixed cash injection vector c, the financial
system is equivalent to (Π, p¯, e + c). Since w > 0, we have that wTp is a strictly
increasing function of p. By Lemma 4 in [1], the clearing payment vector p can be





0 ≤ p ≤ p¯, (1.2)
p ≤ ΠTp+ e+ c. (1.3)
From Theorem 1 in [1], there exists a greatest clearing payment vector p∗. Since W
is a strictly increasing function of p, p∗ is a solution of LP (1.1-1.3). For any other
p 6= p∗, we have pi ≤ p
∗
i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N and at least one of these inequalities is
strict. Thus, wTp < wTp∗. Therefore p∗ is the unique solution of LP (1.1-1.3). This
completes the Proof of Lemma 1.
We now establish the equivalence of Problem I and a linear programming problem.
Theorem 1 Assume that the liabilities matrix L, the asset vector e, the weight vec-
tor w, and the total cash injection amount C are fixed and known. Assume that the
system utilizes the proportional payment mechanism with no bankruptcy costs. Con-
sider Problem I, i.e., the problem of calculating a cash injection allocation c ≥ 0 to
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minimize the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities W = wT (p¯ − p) subject to the bud-






1Tc ≤ C, (1.5)
c ≥ 0, (1.6)
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯, (1.7)
p ≤ ΠTp+ e+ c. (1.8)
Proof Since the constraints on c and p in LP (1.4-1.8) form a closed and bounded
set in R2N , a solution exists. Moreover, for any fixed c, it follows from our Lemma 1
and Lemma 4 in [1] that the linear program has a unique solution for p which is the
clearing payment vector for the system.
Let (p∗, c∗) be a solution to (1.4-1.8). Suppose that there exists a cash injection
allocation that leads to a smaller cost W than does c∗. In other words, suppose that
there exists c′ > 0, with 1Tc′ ≤ C, such that the corresponding clearing payment
vector p′ satisfies wT (p¯− p′) < wT (p¯− p∗), or, equivalently,
wTp∗ < wTp′. (1.9)
Note that c′ satisfies the first two constraints of (1.4-1.8). Moreover, since p′ is
the corresponding clearing payment vector, the last two constraints are satisfied as
well. The pair (p′, c′) is thus in the constraint set of our linear program. Therefore,
Eq. (1.9) contradicts the assumption that (p∗, c∗) is a solution to (1.4-1.8). This
completes the Proof that c∗ is the allocation of C that achieves the smallest possible
cost W .
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In an alternative formulation of Problem I, we are given a weight λ and must
choose the total cash injection amount C and its allocation c to minimize λC +W .







0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ e+ c.
This equivalence follows from Theorem 1: denoting a solution to (1.10) by (C∗,p∗, c∗),
we see that the pair (p∗, c∗) must be a solution to (1.4-1.8) for C = C∗. At the
same time, the fact that C∗ maximizes the objective function in (1.10) means that it
minimizes λC +W = λC +wT (p¯− p), since p¯ is a fixed constant.
1.4 Problem I with Multiple Seniorities
1.4.1 Assumptions and Notation
We now extend our model of Section 1.2 to the case of multiple seniorities. We
assume that a node may only satisfy a liability once it fully repays all of its more senior
liabilities. Within each seniority, we still assume the same proportional payment
scheme as in Section 1.3, and we still assume that there are no bankruptcy costs,
and that each node either pays all its liabilities in full or pays out all its available
funds to its creditors. For all the variables that involve liabilities and payments, we
augment our notation of Section II with superscript k to denote the seniority. For
example, now Lkij is the amount that node i owes to node j at seniority k; d
k
i denotes
whether node i’s liabilities at seniority k are paid in full, etc. Larger numbers denote
more junior obligations. This means that a nonzero payment pki > 0 can only occur
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if all node i’s obligations more senior than k are satisfied in full, i.e., if phi = p¯
h
i for
all h < k. This also means that an incomplete payment pki < p¯
k
i at any seniority k
can only occur if i repays nothing for any of its more junior obligations than k, i.e.,
if phi = 0 for all h > k. We denote the number of distinct seniorities among node i’s
obligations by Ki, and we let K = max
i
Ki. We denote the most senior obligation of
each node by k = 1.
As in Section 1.3, we allow the unpaid liabilities in the objective function to
have different weights for different nodes. In addition, we allow different weights





wkT (p¯k − pk),
subject to 1Tc ≤ C. We assume that all the weights are strictly positive: wki > 0 for
all nodes i and liabilities k.
1.4.2 Optimal Solution to Problem I with Multiple Seniorities
Theorem 2 Assume that the system utilizes the proportional payment mechanism
with multiple seniorities, as defined in Section 1.4.1. Then the optimal cash injection
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vector c∗ and its corresponding clearing payment vectors pk∗, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, are







1Tc ≤ C, (1.12)







j + ei + ci ≥
K∑
k=1
pki , for i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (1.14)





i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , N and k = 1, 2, . . . , K, (1.16)




i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , N and k = 1, 2, . . . , K − 1, (1.17)
dki ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N and k = 1, 2, . . . , K. (1.18)
Proof Assume the solution to MILP (1.11) is (c∗, pk∗, dk∗), k = 1, 2, . . . , K. First,
we prove that pk∗, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, are clearing payment vectors for cash injection
vector c∗. In a clearing payment, node i either fully pays its liabilities or pays all its
available funds. In addition, if node i fails to fully pay its liabilities, it must pay off
the more senior liabilities in full before it starts to pay off the more junior ones.
If pk∗l = p¯
k
l for k = 1, 2, . . . , K, then node l pays all its liabilities in full, which
satisfies the requirements of the clearing payment vectors.
If node l does not pay its liabilities in full, in other words, if there exists a seniority
h such that ph∗l < p¯
h
l , then we prove that node l repays no liabilities more junior than
h and pays all its available funds. If h = K or p¯h+1l = 0, there are no liabilities junior
to h for node l. If h < K and p¯h+1l > 0, we have d
h∗
l = 1 due to constraints (1.16)
and (1.18) and then as a consequence of constraint (1.17), ph+1∗l = 0. Moreover, we
have ph+1∗l < p¯
h+1
l . Thus, by induction, for all k > h, we have p
k∗
l = 0, which proves
that node l does not repay any liabilities more junior than h.
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We furthermore prove that if there is a nonzero payment phl > 0 at some seniority
h, this means that node l repays in full all its obligations more senior than h. If h = 1
then there are no liabilities senior to h for node l. If h > 1, then constraints (1.17)
and (1.18) imply that dh−1l = 0. But then constraints (1.15) and (1.16) imply that
ph−1l = p¯
h−1
l , and so l’s obligations at seniority h − 1 are paid in full. Applying this
argument inductively for seniorities h − 1, h − 2, . . . , 1 shows that all l’s obligations
more senior than h are paid in full.



















j + el + cl >
K∑
k=1
pk∗l . We construct a new
solution pkǫ, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, which is equal to pk∗, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, in all components
















j + el + cl >
K∑
k=1
pkǫl . Since Π is a three-dimensional matrix with





















Thus, the new solution (c∗, pkǫ, dk∗), k = 1, 2, . . . , K, is also in the feasible region
of (1.12 - 1.18) and achieves a larger value of the objective function than (c∗, pk∗,
dk∗), k = 1, 2, . . . , K. This contradicts the fact that (c∗, pk∗, dk∗), k = 1, 2, . . . , K,
is a solution to (1.11). Hence, Eq. (1.19) holds and pk∗, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, are clearing
payment vectors.
Second, we prove by contradiction that c∗ is the optimal cash injection allocation.
Assume c+ 6= c∗ leads to a strictly smaller value of the weighted sum of unpaid
liabilities than does c∗. In other words, suppose that c+ satisfies the constraints
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(1.12) and (1.13) and that the corresponding clearing payment vectors pk+ satisfy
K∑
k=1
wkT (p¯k − pk+) <
K∑
k=1







Since pk+, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, are the corresponding clearing payment vectors, con-
straints (1.14) and (1.15) are satisfied. Moreover, if we define dk+i as the binary
variable indicating whether node i fully repays its liabilities with seniority k, then con-
straints (1.16), (1.17) and (1.18) are also satisfied. So (c+,pk+,dk+), k = 1, 2, . . . , K,
is in the feasible region of (1.11–1.18) and achieves a larger value of the objective
function than (c∗, pk∗, dk∗), k = 1, 2, . . . , K, which contradicts the fact that (c∗, pk∗,
dk∗), k = 1, 2, . . . , K, is the solution of (1.11–1.18).
In MILP (1.11), constraints (1.12)-(1.13) are on the cash injection vector. All the
cash injections must be non-negative and the total amount must not exceed the over-
all cash injection budget. Constraints (1.14)-(1.15) ensure that the actual payment of
a node cannot exceed its total liability or its total available funds. Constraints (1.16)-
(1.18) enforce the requirements that any node i can only make an incomplete repay-
ment at any seniority k if its repayments at the more junior seniorities are all zeros;
and that it can only make a nonzero repayment at seniority k if it repays in full all
the obligations senior to k.
1.4.3 Numerical Simulations
To solve MILP (1.11), we use CVX, a package for specifying and solving convex
programs and also MILPs [2,3]. In CVX, we selectMosek to be the solver [46]. A vari-
ety of prior literature, e.g. [6], suggests that the US interbank network is well modeled
as a core-periphery network that consists of a core of about 15 highly interconnected
banks to which most other banks connect. Therefore, we test the running time on
a modified core-periphery network with multiple seniorities, as shown in Fig. 1.1. It
17
15 core nodes: fully connected; five seniorities for each core node
70 periphery nodes: 
1st seniority link to a core node
2nd seniority link to another core node
Fig. 1.1. A core-periphery network with liabilities with multiple seniorities.
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contains 15 fully connected core nodes, denoted by core node 1 to core node 15. For
each pair of core nodes i and j, there are five links with different seniorities. The
amount of liability Lkij (k = 1, 2, . . . , 5) is uniformly distributed in [0, 10]. Each core
node i has 70 periphery nodes. Each periphery node has a single link with seniority
1 pointing to the corresponding core node. In addition, each periphery node of core
node i has another link with seniority 2 pointing to a random core node (uniformly
selected among core nodes 1 to 15). For a core node i and its periphery node l, the
obligation amount Lkli (k = 1, 2) is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. All the obligation
amounts are independent. Every node has zero external assets: e = 0. For a core
node i, we set the weight wki = 10 for k = 1, 2, . . . , 5; for a periphery node l, we set the
weight wkl = 1 for k = 1, 2. The regulator has $300 to be injected into the network.
For this modified core-periphery network, we generate 100 samples. We run the CVX
code on a personal computer with a 2.66GHz Intel Core2 Duo Processor P8800. The
average running time is 9.85s and the sample standard deviation is 0.15s. The rela-
tive gap between the objective of the solution and the optimal objective is less than
10−4. (This bound is obtained by calculating the optimal value of the objective for
the corresponding linear program, which is an upper bound for the optimal objective
value of the MILP.) We can see that for the core-periphery network, MILP (1.11) can
be solved by CVX efficiently and accurately. The CVX code is given in Appendix B.1.
1.5 Problem I with Credit Default Swaps
1.5.1 Clearing with CDSs
In this section, we incorporate credit default swaps (CDSs) into our framework.
For simplification, we just consider the system with only one seniority. As defined
in [38], a CDS is a contract whereby the seller node i insures the buyer node j against
the default of node l on its underlying liabilities. In other words, a liability from node
















Fig. 1.2. Example showing a simultaneous clearing payment vector
may not exist in a system with CDSs.
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With CDSs in the system, a simultaneous clearing payment vector does not nec-
essarily exist. For example, in Fig. 1.2, node A owes $10 to node B; node B owes $10
to node C and node C owes $10 to A and $10 to D. Node D sells a CDS to node
C such that if node B defaults, node D will pay $10 to node C as a compensation.
Initially, there is no cash among A, B and C. Node D has $10 on hand. Without
CDSs, no nodes are able to make their payments so that A, B and C default. Then
node D pays node C $10 according to the CDS contract. With this $10 on C’s hand,
all the liabilities in the system are cleared so that all nodes are rescued including B,
which makes C ineligible for D’s payment. Thus, there is no simultaneous clearing
payment vector in this network.
Instead of the simultaneous clearing scheme, we clear the system with CDSs in
three stages:
1. The system clears its original liabilities without considering CDSs.
2. New liabilities due to CDSs are created. The system clears these liabilities due
to CDSs.
3. The system clears the remaining original liabilities.
In each stage above, the system is cleared according to the simultaneous clearing
method in [1]. Thus, there exists a unique clearing payment vector for each stage.
As defined in Section 1.2, the cash owned by node i, the external cash injection
into node i, and the original liability from node i to node j are denoted by ei, ci, and
Lij , respectively. We let di be the stage 1 default indicator for node i. The CDS-
induced obligation from node i to node j triggered by the default of node l is denoted
by Dlij . We define xi and zi to be the fractions of node i’s total underlying liability
N∑
j=1
Lij that node i repays during stages 1 and 3, respectively. Thus, node i’s total



















(1− xi − zi).
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We moreover let yi be the fraction of node i’s total CDS-induced liability that
node i repays during stage 2. Furthermore, for any two nodes l and i, we define
yli =

 yi if node l defaults during stage 1,0 if node l does not default during stage 1.














dl where dl is node l’s stage 1 default indicator. In other words,
if l defaults in stage 1, i.e., if dl = 1, then i owes
N∑
j=1
Dlij in CDS-induced liabilities
related to l; and if l does not default, i.e., if dl = 0, then i does not have any
CDS-induced liabilities related to l. Therefore, node i’s total unpaid CDS-induced






























This is the objective function we would like to minimize. As previously, the framework
we develop in this section is applicable to weighted sums of liabilities; however, we
omit the weights in order to simplify notation.
1.5.2 Minimizing the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities with CDSs
Assume the system clears the liabilities as described in Section 1.5.1. We inves-
tigate the problem of minimizing the sum of unpaid liabilities under the model with
CDSs.
In [1], it is proved that the clearing payment is unique when the system is regular,
which is always the case if all nodes have some cash on hand. In this section, we
assume the system is regular. Otherwise, we just give each node $1 to make it
regular.
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The following constraints for all i combined with constraints (1.5) and (1.6) will
guarantee a clearing payment for the system in stage 1:








Ljixj + ei + ci, (1.21)
N∑
j=1










(1− di) ≤ xi, (1.23)
di ∈ {0, 1}, (1.24)
1− xi ≥ ǫdi. (1.25)
where ǫ is a small positive constant.
To show that these constraints are consistent with our definitions of x as stage 1
clearing payment vector rescaled to [0, 1] and d as stage 1 default indicator vector, first
note that, because of constraints (1.20) and (1.23), having di = 0 would imply that
xi = 1, i.e., that node i fully repays its obligations during stage 1. Furthermore, if di =







be equal to its available funds
N∑
j=1
Ljixj + ei + ci. Thus, any feasible x in the region
defined by constraints (1.20) - (1.25) is a valid clearing payment vector. Conversely,
note that if xi = 1 (i.e., if node i fully repays its liabilities during stage 1), then
constraints (1.24) and (1.25) imply di = 0. If xi < 1 (i.e., if node i does not repay
its entire liability during stage 1), then constraints (1.23) and (1.24) imply di = 1.
Thus, di is a valid default indicator for node i. Therefore, for any feasible point in
the region defined by constraints (1.20) - (1.25), x is a valid clearing payment vector
rescaled to [0, 1], and d is a valid indicator showing whether node i is in default after
stage 1.
Note that the LP from Theorem 1 which is formulated in Eqs. (1.4 - 1.8), is
somewhat different from the optimization problem of maximizing the objective of
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Eq. (1.4) subject to the constraints of Eqs. (1.5,1.6, 1.20 - 1.25), in the sense that
there are some cases when the latter is infeasible, and there are also cases when the
solutions to the two problems slightly differ. To explain this, we denote the latter
optimization problem by P1. When the total available funds of node i are smaller
than but very close to its total liability, xi might be less than 1 and greater than
1 − ǫ. Then from constraint (1.23), we have di = 0 and from constraint (1.25), we
have di = 1, which is a contradiction. Then, the feasible region of P1 would be empty.
Such cases are atypical since the problematic region for clearing vectors is very small
when ǫ is small. Algorithmically, such cases can be resolved by slightly increasing
the total cash amount C to let node i fully repay its liabilities, i.e., to let xi = 1.
Now suppose that the optimal solution to LP (1.4 - 1.8) has 1− ǫ < xi < 1 and that
P1 is feasible. Then the optimal solution to P1 would use a small amount of cash
injection to ensure xi = 1. In this case, the solution to P1 will be slightly different
from the solution to LP (1.4 - 1.8), but the difference between the values of xi in the
two solutions will be smaller than ǫ.
Now we consider stage 2: clearing the liabilities due to CDSs. After stage 1,
the cash on hand at node i is fi =
N∑
j=1







during stage 2, there may be further defaults among the sellers of the CDSs. The
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clearing payment for the liabilities due to CDSs is located in the region defined by
the following constraints:
0 ≤ yli ≤ dl, (1.26)
yi − y
l
i ≤ 1− dl, (1.27)































(1− dCDSi ), (1.30)
1− dCDSi ≤ yi, (1.31)
dCDSi ∈ {0, 1}. (1.32)
Constraint (1.26) ensures that if node l is not in default, then yli = 0 so that there are
no payments associated with any CDSs written against l’s default. Constraints (1.27)
and (1.28) guarantee that if both node l and node h are in default, the liabilities due
to the defaults of l and h are paid proportionally, i.e., yli = y
h
i = yi. Binary variable
dCDSi is used to enforce the condition that any node whose stage 2 funds do not exceed
the total stage 2 liability must pay out all its funds during stage 2. In most cases,
dCDSi is the stage 2 default indicator variable for node i. However, in a degenerate
case when node i’s stage 2 funds are exactly equal to its stage 2 total liabilities, dCDSi
may be either 0 or 1.
In stage 3, we clear the remaining original liabilities which are not fully paid














i. Then the constraints to obtain the clearing payment in stage 3 are:








Ljizj + ri, (1.34)
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where xi is the fraction of node i’s underlying liabilities paid off in stage 1. Here we do
not need the binary indicator any more since it is the last round so that the clearing
payment is achieved if the objective function is strictly increasing with respect to zi.
We therefore have the following result.
Theorem 3 Optimal cash allocation to minimize the sum of the unpaid liabilities in
























ci ≤ C, (1.36)
ci ≥ 0, (1.37)
(1.20)− (1.34).
1.5.3 Numerical Simulations
To solve MILP (1.35), we use CVX, a package for specifying and solving convex
programs and also MILPs [2, 3]. In CVX, we select Gurobi to be the solver [47].
1.5.3.1 Example 1: A Five-Node Network
In this section, we illustrate and verify Theorem 3 on the five-node network shown
in Fig. 1.3(a). Node A owes $10 to B, B owes $10 to C, C owes $10 to A and $10 to
D respectively. If node C defaults in stage 1, node D has a $5 CDS-induced liability
to node A. If node B defaults in stage 1, node D has a $10 CDS-induced liability to
node C. If node D defaults in stage 1, node E has a $10 CDS-induced liability to
node C. Node A, B and C have no cash on hand. Node C has $3. Nodes D and E






























































(d) After stage 3.
Fig. 1.3. A five-node network.
We solve MILP (1.35) for this network via CVX and obtain cash injection vector
c = [0, 0, 3, 0, 0]T , which directs the regulator to inject $3 into node C. With $3 cash
injection to C, the original liabilities are cleared in stage 1. After the clearance in
stage 1, the network is reduced to Fig. 1.3(b). The scaled payment vector is x =
[0.3, 0.3, 0.3, 0, 0]T , which means that nodes A, B and C pay 30% of their liabilities.
The stage 1 default indicator vector is d = [1, 1, 1, 0, 0]T , so nodes A, B and C are in
default in stage 1, while D and E are safe.
Since nodes B and C default in stage 1, the CDS-induced liabilities related to B
and C are created in stage 2, i.e., node D owes $5 to A and $10 to C in stage 2.
The CDS-induced liability from E to C is not triggered since D does not default in
stage 1. In the solution of MILP (1.35) for this network, we have yAD = y
C
D = yD = 0.4
so that in stage 2, node D pays 40% of its CDS-induced liabilities. In addition, the
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scaled payment from E to C is yCE = 0 due to constraint (1.26). The network after
stage 2 is shown in Fig. 1.3(c).
In stage 3, the remaining original liabilities are cleared. The final network af-
ter stage 3 is shown in Fig. 1.3(d). The scaled clearing payment vector is z =
[0.7, 0.7, 0.55, 0, 0]T .
To sum up, nodes A and B pay 30% of their original liabilities in stage 1 and 70%
of their original liabilities in stage 3. Technically they are both in default, since in our
model the inability to fully repay the underlying obligations in stage 1 is defined as
default. Note, however, that because of the CDS-related payments cleared in stage 2,
both of them are able to fully repay their remaining underlying obligations in stage 3.
Thus, even though A and B both default, their defaults have a 100% recovery rate,
i.e., their creditors are fully repaid after stage 3. Node C defaults and has $3 unpaid
liabilities after three-stage clearing. Node D does not have any original liabilities, but
it defaults in stage 2 since it fails to fully pay its CDS-induced liabilities. Node E
stays safe since it does not have any original liabilities and the CDS-induced liability
is not triggered.
1.5.3.2 Example 2: A Core-Periphery Network
In this section we examine the practicality of the mixed-integer linear program.
We test the running time on a core-periphery network with CDSs shown in Fig. 1.17.
It contains 15 fully connected core nodes. Each core node has 70 periphery nodes.
Each periphery node has a single link pointing to the corresponding core node. The
asset of each node is uniformly distributed in [0, 0.01] so that the system is regular.
All the obligation amounts Li,j are independent uniform random variables. For each
pair of core nodes i and j the obligation amount Lij is uniformly distributed in [0, 10].
For a core node i and its periphery node k, the obligation amount Lki is uniformly
distributed in [0, 1]. We assume only core nodes buy and sell CDSs. For any pair of
core nodes i, j, and the underlying, node l, node i sells a CDS with underlying l to
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15 core nodes: fully connected
70 periphery nodes for each core node: 
1 link to the core node
Original liability
Liability due to CDS
Fig. 1.4. A core-periphery network with CDSs.
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node j with probability 0.01. The amount of the CDS-induced liability is uniform
in [0, 1]. In other words, Dlij is uniformly distributed in [0, 1] with probability 0.01,
and zero with probability 0.99. The weights of original liabilities and the weights
of CDS-induces liabilities are all the same , i.e., w = 1. The regulator has $100
to be injected into the network. For this core-periphery network, we generate 100
samples. We run the CVX code on a personal computer with a 2.66GHz Intel Core2
Duo Processor P8800. The average running time is 7.0s and the sample standard
deviation is 3.6s. The relative gap between the objective of the solution and the
optimal objective is less than 10−4. (This bound is obtained by calculating the optimal
value of the objective for the corresponding linear program, which is an upper bound
for the optimal objective value of the MILP.) We can see that for the core-periphery
network, MILP (1.35) can be solved by CVX efficiently and accurately. The CVX
code is given in Appendix B.2.
1.6 Heuristic Algorithms for Problem II under the Proportional Payment
Mechanism
Given that the total amount of cash injection is C, Problem II seeks to find a cash
injection allocation vector c to minimize the number of defaults Nd, i.e., the number
of nonzero entries in vector p¯ − p. In other words, in Problem II, we would like to
make vector p¯− p as sparse as possible.
In this section, we propose two heuristic algorithms to solve Problem II approx-
imately. First, we adapt the reweighted ℓ1 minimization strategy approach from
Section 2.2 of [4]. Our algorithm solves a sequence of weighted versions of the linear
program (1.4-1.8), with the weights designed to encourage sparsity of p¯ − p. In the
following pseudo code of our algorithm, w(m) is the weight vector during the m-th
iteration.
Reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm:
1. m← 0.
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2. Select w0 (e.g., w0 ← 1).
3. Solve linear program (1.4-1.8) with objective function replaced by w(m)Tp.











− 1 + ǫ
,
where ǫ > 0 is constant, and p∗(m) is the clearing payment vector obtained in
Step 3.
5. If ‖w(m+1)−w(m)‖1 < δ, where δ > 0 is a constant, stop; else, increment m and
go to Step 3.
Note that nodes for which p¯i − p
∗(m)
i is very small require very little additional
resources to avoid default. This is why Step 4 is designed to give more weight to
such nodes, thereby encouraging larger cash injections into them. On the other hand,
nodes for which p¯i − p
∗(m)
i is very large require a lot of cash to become solvent. The
algorithm essentially “gives up” on such nodes by assigning them small weights.
The second heuristic algorithm we develop is a greedy algorithm. At each iteration
of the greedy algorithm, we calculate the clearing payment vector and select the
node with the smallest unpaid liability among all the defaulting nodes. We inject
cash into that node to rescue it so that during each iteration, we save the one node
that requires the smallest cash expenditure. In this procedure, we inject the cash
sequentially, bailing out some nodes completely before they fully receive the payments
from their borrowers. These nodes may subsequently receive some more cash from
their borrowers if their borrowers are rescued several steps later. Because of this, a
rescued node may end up with a surplus. If this happens, the node would use its
surplus to repay its cash injection. Such repayments can then be used to assist other
nodes. The algorithm terminates either when there are no defaults in the system or















Fig. 1.5. Binary tree network.
1. Cr ← C, c← 0, w← 1.
2. Solve linear program (1.1-1.3) to obtain the clearing payment vector p.
3. Calculate the surplus of each node after clearing: r← ΠTp+ e+ c− p.
4. Update the remaining cash to be injected into the system after the rescued nodes
repay their cash injections: Cr ← Cr +
N∑
i=1
min{ri, ci}, ci ← ci −min{ci, ri} for
i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
5. If Cr = 0 or there are no defaults in the system, stop.
6. Find node k with the minimum unpaid liability p¯k − pk among all defaulting
nodes.
7. ck ← min{Cr, p¯k − pk}, Cr ← Cr − ck, go to Step 2.
We now illustrate our two heuristic algorithms using three simple synthetic net-
works for which the optimal solutions can be calculated exactly.
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Fig. 1.6. Our algorithms for minimizing the number of defaults vs
the optimal solution calculated in Section 1.6.1, for the binary tree
network of Fig. 1.5.
1.6.1 Example: A Binary Tree Network
First, we use a full binary tree with S levels and N = 2S − 1 nodes. As shown in
Fig. 1.5, levels 0 and S− 1 correspond to the root and the leaves, respectively. Every
node at level s < S − 1 owes $2S−s to each of its two creditors (children). We set
e = 0.
If C < 8, then all 2S−1 − 1 non-leaf nodes are in default, and the 2S−1 leaves are
not in default. In aggregate, the nodes at any level s < S − 1 owe $2S+1 the nodes
at level s+ 1. Therefore, if C ≥ 2S+1, then Nd = 0 can be achieved by allocating the
entire amount to the root node.
For 8 ≤ C < 2S+1, we first observe that if C = 2S+1−s for some integer s, then
the optimal solution is to allocate the entire amount to a node at level s. This would
prevent the defaults of this node and all its 2S−s−1 − 2 non-leaf descendants, leading
to 2S−1− 2S−s−1 defaults. If C is not a power of two, we can represent it as a sum of
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powers of two and apply the same argument recursively, to yield the following optimal
number of defaults:
Nd = T (S)−
U∑
u=4
b(u) · T (u− 2),
where T (x) = 2x−1− 1 is the number of non-leaf nodes in an x-level complete binary
tree, b(u) is the u-th bit in the binary representation of C (right to left) and U is the
number of bits. To summarize, the smallest number of defaults Nd, as a function of








b(u)T (u− 2) if 8 ≤ C < 2S+1,
0 if C ≥ 2S+1.
(1.38)
In our test, we set S = 10. The green line in Fig. 1.6 represents the minimum
number of defaults as a function of C, as shown in Eq. (1.38). The blue line is the
solution calculated by the reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm with ǫ = 0.001 and
δ = 10−6. The algorithm was run using six different initializations: five random ones
and w(0) = 1. Among the six solutions, the one with the smallest number of defaults
was selected. The red line is the solution provided by the greedy algorithm. Fig. 1.6
shows that the results of the reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm are very close to
the optimal for the entire range of C, while the performance of the greedy algorithm
is poor. The greedy algorithm always injects cash into the nodes at level S− 2 which
have the smallest unpaid liabilities. For C ≥ 16, this strategy is inefficient since
spending $16 on a node at level S − 3 rescues both that node and its two children,
whereas spending $16 on two nodes at level S − 2 only rescues those two nodes.
To investigate the sensitivity of the reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm to our
random initialization strategy, we conduct the following experiment with the binary
tree topology. For each of the 11 amounts of cash injection C = 0, 200, 400, . . . , 2000,
we repeat the algorithm 100 times. The five random initial weights in all these runs
are chosen independently. The results are shown in Fig. 1.7. The green squares mark
the numbers of defaults for the optimal solutions. The blue crosses show, for each
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average of reweighted ℓ1 minimization
± standard deviation
Fig. 1.7. Reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm with different initial-
izations for the binary tree network of Fig. 1.5.
of the 11 values of C, the average number of defaults over 100 repetitions of the
reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm. The dashed blue lines show the band of ±1
standard deviations around the mean. Note that the means are close to the optimal
solutions, and that the standard deviations are small, indicating that the algorithm
is robust to the initial weights.
1.6.2 Example: A Network with Cycles
Second, we test our algorithms on the network with cycles shown in Fig. 1.8. The
network contains M cycles with six nodes each. The nodes in the k-th cycle are
denoted nk1, nk2, · · · , nk6. Node nk1 owes $2a to nk2. Node nk6 owes $a to nk1. For
i = 2, · · · , 5, nki owes $a to nk(i+1). The root node, denoted as nR, owes $a to nk1,
for every k = 1, 2, · · · ,M . We set e = 0.
If C < a, then the root node and all M nodes connected to the root, nk1(k =





































Fig. 1.8. Network topology with cycles.

























Fig. 1.9. Our algorithms for minimizing the number of defaults vs
the optimal solution calculated in Section 1.6.2, for the network of
Fig. 1.8.
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If C ≥ aM , then allocating the entire amount C to the root yields zero defaults.
If a ≤ C < aM , then giving $a to node nk1 will prevent it from defaulting. Thus,
the total number of defaults in this case is M + 1− [C/a].
Summarizing, for this network structure, the smallest number of defaults Nd, as




M + 1 if C < a,
M + 1− [C/a] if a ≤ C < aM,
0 if C ≥ aM.
(1.39)
In our test, we set a = 10 and M = 100. In Fig. 1.9, the green line is a plot of
the minimum number of defaults as a function of C. The blue line is the solution
calculated by the reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm with ǫ = 0.001 and δ =
10−6. The algorithm was run using six different initializations: five random ones and
w(0) = 1. Among the six solutions, the one with the smallest number of defaults
was selected. The red line is the solution calculated by the greedy algorithm. As
evident from Fig. 1.9, the results produced by both algorithms are very close to
the optimal ones. The greedy algorithm achieves the optimal solution for the entire
range of C except the point C = 1000. When C = 1000, the optimal strategy is to
inject $1000 into the root node whereas the greedy algorithm injects $10 into nk1 for
k = 1, 2, · · · , 100.
1.6.3 Example: A Core-Periphery Network
Third, we test our algorithm on a simple core-periphery network, since core-
periphery models are widely used to model banking systems [7,8,48,49]. In Fig. 1.10,
i, ii, and iii are the three core nodes. Node i owes $100 each to nodes ii and iii, and
node ii owes $100 to iii. Ten periphery nodes are attached to each core node, and
each periphery node owes $20 to its core node. There are no external assets in the















Fig. 1.10. Core-periphery network topology.
If the cash injection amount is C < 100, the optimal solution is to select any
[C/20] periphery nodes and give $20 to each of them. This reduces the number of
defaults by [C/20].
If 100 ≤ C < 200, we first select any five periphery nodes of core node ii and give
$20 to each of them, because this saves both node ii and these five periphery nodes.
Then we select any other ⌊(C − 100)/20⌋ periphery nodes and give $20 to each. This
decreases the number of defaults by ⌊C/20⌋+ 1.
If 200 ≤ C < 600, we first use $200 to rescue all 10 periphery nodes of core node
i, saving i, ii, and these 10 periphery nodes. Then we select any other ⌊(C−200)/20⌋
periphery nodes and give $20 to each. This decreases the number of defaults by
⌊C/20⌋+ 2.
If C ≥ 600, then all the nodes can be rescued by giving $20 to each periphery
node.
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Fig. 1.11. Our algorithms for minimizing the number of defaults vs
the optimal solution calculated in Section 1.6.3, for the network of
Fig. 1.10.
To sum up, for this core-periphery network structure, the smallest number of




32− ⌊C/20⌋ if C < 100,
31− ⌊C/20⌋ if 100 ≤ C < 200,
30− ⌊C/20⌋ if 200 ≤ C < 600,
0 if C ≥ 600.
(1.40)
In Fig. 1.11, the green line is a plot of this minimum number of defaults as a
function of C. The blue line is the solution calculated by our reweighted ℓ1 mini-
mization algorithm with ǫ = 0.001 and δ = 10−6. The algorithm was run using six
different initializations: five random ones and w(0) = 1. Among the six solutions, the
one with the smallest number of defaults was selected. The red line is the solution
calculated by the greedy algorithm. As evident from Fig. 1.11, the results produced
by the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm are very close to the optimal ones for the entire range
of C. Note that for the greedy algorithm, the performance depends on the order of
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5 core nodes: fully connected
20 periphery nodes for each core node: 
1 link to the core node
Fig. 1.12. Random core-periphery network to compare the reweighted
ℓ1 algorithm and the greedy algorithm.
rescuing nodes with the same unpaid liability amounts. For example, if the greedy
algorithms rescue the periphery nodes of core node iii first, the performance would
be poor.
1.6.4 Example: Three Random Networks
We now compare the reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm to the greedy algo-
rithm using more complex network topologies in which the optimal solution is difficult
to calculate directly.
We construct three types of random networks, all having external asset vector
e = 0. The first one is a random graph with 30 nodes. For any pair of nodes i and j,
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5 core nodes: fully connected
20 periphery chains
for each core node: 
1 link to the core node
v
Fig. 1.13. Random core-periphery network with long chains to com-
pare the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm and the greedy algorithm.
Lij is zero with probability 0.8 and is uniformly distributed in [0, 2] with probability
0.2.
The second one is a random core-periphery network which is illustrated in Fig. 1.12.
The core contains five nodes which are fully connected. The liability from one core
node to every other core node is uniformly distributed in [0, 20]. Each core node has
20 periphery nodes. Each periphery node owes money only to its core node. This
amount of money is uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
The third one is a random core-periphery network with chains of periphery nodes.
As shown in Fig. 1.13, the core contains five nodes which are fully connected. The
liability from one core node to every other core node is uniformly distributed in [0,20].
Each core node has 20 periphery chains connected to it, each chain consisting of either
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a single periphery node (short chains) or 3 periphery nodes (long chains). Each core
node has either only short periphery chains connected to it or only long periphery
chains connected to it. There are two core nodes with long periphery chains. The
liability amounts along each long chain are the same, and are uniformly distributed
in [0,1]. The liability amounts along each short chain are also uniformly distributed
in [0,1].
For each of these three random networks, we generate 100 samples from the dis-
tribution and run both the reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm and the greedy
algorithm on each sample network. In the reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm, we
set ǫ = 0.001, δ = 10−6. We run the algorithm using six different initializations:
five random ones and w(0) = 1. Among the six solutions, the one with the smallest
number of defaults is selected.
The results are shown in Figs. 1.14, 1.15, and 1.16. The blue and red solid lines
represent the average numbers of defaulting nodes after the cash injection allocated by
the two algorithms: blue for the reweighted ℓ1 minimization and red for the greedy
algorithm. The dashed lines show the error bars for the estimates of the average.
Each error bar is ±two standard errors.
From Fig. 1.14, we see the performance of the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm is close to
the greedy algorithm on the random networks. From Fig. 1.15 and Fig. 1.16, we see
that on random core-periphery networks, the greedy algorithm performs better than
the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm, while on random core-periphery networks with chains,
the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm is better.
1.7 Problem III under the Proportional Payment Mechanism
We now investigate Problem III which is a combination of Problem I and Prob-
lem II. Instead of just minimizing the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities or the number
of defaulting nodes, we consider an objective function which is a linear combination
42
































Fig. 1.14. Two heuristic algorithms for minimizing the number of
defaults: evaluation on random networks.



































Fig. 1.15. Two heuristic algorithms for minimizing the number of
defaults: evaluation on random core-periphery networks.
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Fig. 1.16. Two heuristic algorithms for minimizing the number of
defaults: evaluation on random core-periphery networks with long
chains.
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of the sum of weights over the defaulting nodes and the weighted sum of unpaid
liabilities:
D = wT (p¯− p) + vTd.
As defined in Table 1.1, di is a binary variable indicating whether node i defaults:
di = 1 if p¯i − pi > 0 and di = 0 if p¯i − pi = 0. vi is the weight of node i’s default.
Since D is strictly decreasing with respect to p, Lemma 4 in [1] implies that
minimizing D will yield a clearing payment vector. In light of this fact, we prove that
minimizing D subject to a fixed injected cash amount C is equivalent to a mixed-
integer linear program.
Theorem 4 Assume that the liabilities matrix L, the external asset vector e, the
weight vectors w > 0 and v > 0 and the total cash injection amount C are fixed and
known. Assume that the system utilizes the proportional payment mechanism with no
bankruptcy costs. Define d as in Table 1.1. Then the optimal cash allocation policy
to minimize the cost function D = wT (p¯ − p) + vTd can be obtained by solving the





1Tc ≤ C, (1.42)
c ≥ 0, (1.43)
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯, (1.44)
p ≤ ΠTp+ e+ c, (1.45)
p¯i − pi ≤ p¯idi, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (1.46)
di ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (1.47)
Proof Let (p∗, c∗, d∗) be a solution of the mixed-integer linear program (1.41–
1.47). We first show that p∗ is a clearing payment vector, i.e., that for each i, we







j + ei + ci. Assume that this is not the case for some
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j + ek + ck. We construct a vector p
ξ
which is equal to p∗ in all components except the k-th component. We set the k-th
component of pξ to be pξk = p
∗








j + ek + ck. Since Π is a matrix with non-negative entries, for any













j + ei + ci.
In addition, p¯k − p
ξ
k < p¯k − p
∗
k ≤ p¯kdk. Thus, (p
ξ, c∗, d∗) is also in the feasible region
of (1.41–1.47) and achieves a larger value of the objective function than (p∗, c∗, d∗).
This contradicts the fact that (p∗, c∗, d∗) is a solution of (1.41–1.47). Hence, p∗ is a
clearing payment vector.
Second, we show that d∗i indicates whether node i defaults, i.e., d
∗
i = Ip¯i−p∗i>0. If
p¯i − p
∗
i > 0, then d
∗
i = 1 due to constraints (1.46) and (1.47). If p¯i − p
∗
i = 0, then
constraint (1.46) is always true. In this case the fact that vi > 0 implies that, in order
to maximize the objective function, d∗i must be zero. Thus, d
∗
i = Ip¯i−p∗i>0.
So far, we have proved that p∗ and d∗ are the clearing payment vector and default
indicator vector, respectively, for cash injection vector c∗. We now prove by contradic-
tion that c∗ is the optimal cash injection allocation. Assume c′ 6= c∗ leads to a strictly
smaller value of the cost function D than does c∗. In other words, suppose that c′ sat-
isfies the constraints (1.42) and (1.43), and that the corresponding clearing payment
vector p′ and default indicator vector d′ satisfywT (p¯−p′)+vTd′ < wT (p¯−p∗)+vTd∗,
which is equivalent to:
wTp′ − vTd′ > wTp∗ − vTd∗.
Since p′ is the corresponding clearing payment vector, constraint (1.44) and (1.45)
are satisfied. Moreover, d′ is the corresponding default indicator vector satisfying
constraint (1.46) and (1.47) for c′. So (p′,c′,d′) is in the feasible region of (1.41–1.47)
and achieves a larger objective function than (p∗, c∗, d∗), which contradicts the fact
that (p∗, c∗, d∗) is the solution of (1.41–1.47).
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15 core nodes: fully connected
70 periphery nodes for each core node: 
1 link to the core node
Fig. 1.17. A core-periphery network.
1.7.1 Numerical Simulations
We use CVX with solver Gurobi [47] to solve MILP (1.41). We test the running
time on the core-periphery network shown in Fig. 1.17, which contains 15 fully con-
nected core nodes and 70 periphery nodes for each of them. Each periphery node
has a single link pointing to the corresponding core node. Every node has zero exter-
nal assets: e = 0. All the obligation amounts Li,j are independent uniform random
variables. For each pair of core nodes i and j the obligation amount Lij is uniformly
distributed in [0, 10]. For a core node i and its periphery node k, the obligation
amount Lki is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. The weights of defaults are 1 for all core
nodes, and are 0.1 for all periphery nodes. The weights of unpaid liabilities are uni-











Fig. 1.18. Financial network used in the Proof of Theorem 5. For this
network, Problem I under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism is a
knapsack problem.
For this core-periphery network, we generate 100 samples. We run the CVX code on
a personal computer with a 2.66GHz Intel Core2 Duo Processor P8800. The average
running time is 0.90s and the sample standard deviation is 0.55s. The relative gap
between the objective of the solution and the optimal objective is less than 5× 10−3.
(This bound is obtained by calculating the optimal value of the objective for the cor-
responding linear program, which is an upper bound for the optimal objective value
of the MILP.) MILP (1.41) can be solved by CVX efficiently and accurately. The
CVX code is given in Appendix B.3.
1.8 All-or-Nothing Payment Mechanism
We now show that under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, Problem I is
NP-hard. Despite this fact, we show through simulations that for network sizes
comparable to the size of the US banking system, this problem can be solved in a few
seconds on a personal computer using modern optimization software.
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Theorem 5 With the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, Problem I is NP-hard since
the knapsack problem is reducible to Problem I.
Proof Consider the network depicted in Fig. 1.18. The network has N = 2M nodes
where M is a positive integer. We let Li,M+i = p¯i for i = 1, 2, · · · ,M ; for all other
pairs (i, j), we set Lij = 0. We set the external asset vector to zero: e = 0. We set
all the weights to 1: w = 1. We let xi be the rescue indicator variable for node i, i.e.,
xi = 0 if i is in default and xi = 1 if i is fully rescued, for i = 1, · · · ,M .
Note that under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, fully rescuing node i for
any i = 1, · · · ,M in Fig. 1.18 means injecting ci = p¯i. On the other hand, injecting
any other nonzero amount ci < p¯i is wasteful, as it does not reduce the total amount
of unpaid liabilities in the system. Therefore, for each defaulting node i we have
xi = 0, ci = 0, and pi = 0, and for each rescued node i we have xi = 1, ci = p¯i, and




















xi ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, 2, · · · ,M.
If any cash remains, it can be arbitrarily allocated among the remaining nodes or
not spent at all, because partially rescuing a node does not lead to any improvement
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of the objective function. Program (1.48) is a knapsack problem, a well-known NP-
hard problem. Thus, Problem I under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism is an
NP-hard problem.
We now establish a mixed-integer linear program to solve Problem I with the
all-or-nothing payment mechanism.
Theorem 6 Assume that the liabilities matrix L, the external asset vector e, the
weight vector w > 0 and the total cash injection amount C are fixed and known.
Assume the all-or-nothing payment mechanism. Then Problem I is equivalent to the





1Tc ≤ C, (1.50)
c ≥ 0, (1.51)




Πjipj − ei − ci ≤ p¯idi, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (1.53)
di ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (1.54)
Proof Let (p∗, c∗,d∗) be a solution of the mixed-integer linear program (1.49–1.54).
We first show that p∗ is the clearing payment vector corresponding to c∗. For node





j + ei + ci, then from constraints (1.53) and (1.54) it follows that
d∗i = 1 so that p
∗





j + ei + ci, then constraint (1.53) is satisfied
for both di = 0 and di = 1. In this case, in order to maximize the objective function,
it must be that d∗ = 0 and p∗i = p¯i. This completes the Proof that p
∗ is the clearing
payment vector corresponding to c∗ under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism.
Second, we prove by contradiction that c∗ is the optimal allocation. Assume that
c′ leads to a smaller weighted sum of unpaid liabilities, or equivalently, a larger value
50
of wTp′, where p′ is the clearing payment vector corresponding to c′. Since p′ is a



















i = p¯i. We define vector d
′ as d′i = 0 for p
′
i = p¯i and
d′i = 1 otherwise. Then (p
′, c′,d′) is located in the feasible region of MILP (1.49–1.54)
but leads to a larger value of the objective function than (p∗, c∗,d∗). This contradicts
the fact that (p∗, c∗,d∗) is a solution of (1.49–1.54).
Under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, Problem I with multiple seniorities
is equivalent to the one with single seniority because an institution either pays off all
the liabilities at different seniorities or none of them.
Now we consider Problem II and Problem III under the all-or-nothing payment
mechanism. The objective that we aim to maximize in Problem II is the number
of non-defaulting nodes. If node i defaults, it repays zero liabilities and contributes
zero to the objective; if node i does not default, it pays off p¯i and contributes one
to the objective, which means that the weight for node i in the objective is 1/p¯i.
Therefore, under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, Problem II is a special case
for Problem I when we set the weight wi = 1/p¯i for nonzero p¯i and wi = 0 for zero
p¯i in MILP (1.49). Similarly, Problem III can also be transformed to Problem I by
setting wi = w
′
i + vi/p¯i for nonzero p¯i and wi = w
′
i for zero p¯i in MILP (1.49), where
w′i is the original weight for node i’s unpaid liabilities in Problem III and vi is the
weight of node i’s default.
1.8.1 Numerical Simulations
To solve MILP (1.49), we use CVX, a package for specifying and solving convex
programs and also MILPs [2, 3]. In CVX, we select Mosek to be the solver [46].
We test the running time on the core-periphery network shown in Fig. 1.17, which
contains 15 fully connected core nodes and 70 periphery nodes for each of them. Each
periphery node has a single link pointing to the corresponding core node. Every node
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has zero external assets: e = 0. All the obligation amounts Li,j are independent
uniform random variables. For each pair of core nodes i and j the obligation amount
Lij is uniformly distributed in [0, 10]. For a core node i and its periphery node k,
the obligation amount Lki is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. For a core node i, we
set the weight wi = 10; for a periphery node k, we set the weight wk = 1. The
regulator has $300 to be injected into the network. For this core-periphery network,
we generate 100 samples. We run the CVX code on a personal computer with a
2.66GHz Intel Core2 Duo Processor P8800. The average running time is 1.9s and
the sample standard deviation is 2.0s. The relative gap between the objective of the
solution and the optimal objective is less than 10−4. (This bound is obtained by
calculating the optimal value of the objective for the corresponding linear program,
which is an upper bound for the optimal objective value of the MILP.) If the optimal
value of the objective is in the millions of dollars, a relative error of 10−4 means that
we are within a few hundred dollars away from that optimum, which is a reasonable
precision. MILP (1.49) can be solved by CVX efficiently and accurately. The CVX
code is given in Appendix B.4.
1.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have developed a linear program to obtain the optimal cash
injection policy to minimize the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities in a basic model
with one period and a single seniority. We also incorporate multiple seniorities and
CDS into the basic model so that it could be adapted to more realistic financial
systems. With such extensions, the linear program turns into mixed-integer linear
programs. We have further proposed a reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm based
on this linear program and a greedy algorithm to find the cash injection allocation
strategy which minimizes the number of defaults in the system. By constructing three
topologies in which the optimal solution can be calculated directly, we have tested
both algorithms and shown through simulation that the results of the reweighted
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ℓ1 minimization algorithm are close to optimal, and that the performance of the
greedy algorithm highly depends on the network topology. We also compare these
two algorithms using three types of random networks for which the optimal solution is
not available. In addition, we have shown that the introduction of the all-or-nothing
payment mechanism turns the optimal cash injection allocation problem into an NP-
hard mixed-integer linear program. We have shown through simulations that this
problem can be accurately solved in a few seconds for a network size comparable
to the size of the US banking network. Our results provide algorithmic tools to
help financial institutions, banking supervisory authorities, regulatory agencies, and
clearing houses in monitoring and mitigating systemic risk in financial networks.
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2. A DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM FOR SYSTEMIC
RISK MITIGATION IN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, we showed in Theorem 1 that Problem I without bankruptcy costs
is equivalent to a linear program, and therefore can be solved exactly, for any network
topology, using standard LP solvers. In some scenarios, however, this approach may
be impractical or undesirable, as it requires the solver to know the entire network
structure, namely, the net external assets of every institution, as well as the amounts
owed by each institution to each other institution. To collect and effectively use all
this information in a centralized fashion would impose a prohibitive regulatory burden
both on the financial institutions and on the regulators themselves.
In this chapter, we adapt our framework to applications where it is necessary to
avoid centralized data gathering and computation. We propose a distributed algo-
rithm to solve our linear program. The algorithm is iterative and is based on message
passing between each node and its neighbors. During each iteration of the algorithm,
each node only needs to receive a small amount of data from its neighbors, perform
simple calculations, and transmit a small amount of data to its neighbors. During the
message passing, no node will reveal to any other node any proprietary information
on its asset values, the amounts owed to other nodes, or the amounts owed by other
nodes.
We verify the convergence of the distributed algorithm on a four-node network and
estimate the practical time to converge. While the algorithm is slower than standard
centralized LP solvers, simulations suggest its practicality for the US banking system
which we model as a core-periphery network with 15 core nodes and 1050 periphery
nodes.
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Our algorithm can be used both to monitor financial networks and to simulate
stress-testing scenarios. The integrity of the process can be enforced by the supervi-
sory authorities through auditing.
This chapter is organized as follows. A duality-based distributed algorithm for
Problem I under the proportional payment mechanism is proposed in Section 2.2. In
Section 2.3, we further extend the distributed algorithm for the alternative formula-
tion of Problem I. We illustrate the practicality of the distributed algorithm for the
network with the same size as the US banking system by simulations in Section 2.4
and conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Problem I under the Proportional Payment Mechanism
2.2.1 A Distributed Algorithm
In this chapter, we follow the same notations defined in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1.
To develop a distributed algorithm for LP (1.4-1.8), we formulate its dual problem and
solve it via gradient descent. We solve the dual problem because unlike the primal,
it has simpler constraints which are easily decomposable. It turns out that every
iteration of the gradient descent involves only local computations, which enables a
distributed implementation.
In order to apply the gradient descent method to the dual problem, we need the
objective function in (1.4) to be strictly concave, which would guarantee that the dual
problem is differentiable at any point [50]. However, the objective function of LP (1.4)
is not strictly concave so we apply the Proximal Optimization Algorithm [51,52]. The
basic idea is to make the objective function strictly concave by adding quadratic terms
that converge to zero at the optimal, so as to avoid changing the solution. A popular
choice for these quadratic terms are the residuals from equality constraints.











to (1.4). Then we proceed as follows.
Algorithm P:
At the t-th iteration,
• P1) Fix y = y(t) and z = z(t) and maximize the objective function with
respect to p and c:
max
p,c
wTp− ‖p− y‖2 − ‖c− z‖2 (2.1)
subject to
1Tc ≤ C, (2.2)
c ≥ 0,
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ e + c. (2.3)
Note that since the objective function is strictly concave, a unique solution
exists. Denote it as p∗ and c∗.
• P2) Set y(t+ 1) = p∗, z(t+ 1) = c∗.
It is proved in Proposition 4.1 in [52] that algorithm P will converge to the optimal
solution of LP (1.4-1.8).
2.2.2 Implementation of Algorithm P
In Step P1, for fixed y and z, the objective function of (2.1) is strictly concave
so that the dual problem is differentiable at any point [50]. Hence, we can solve the
dual problem using gradient descent.
Let a scalar λ and an N × 1 vector q be Lagrange multipliers for constraints (2.2)
and (2.3), respectively. We define the Lagrangian as follows:




where λ and q are non-negative and IN is an N × N identity matrix. We further
expand (2.4):



























































qjΠijpi. Then the objective function of the dual problem is:
D(λ,q,y, z) = max
0≤p≤p¯,c≥0
L(p, c, λ,q,y, z). (2.7)
In Eq. (2.6), the term qjΠij is 0 if node i is not a borrower of j. Thus, if node i
receives all the qj from its lenders, it can determine pi and ci to achieve the maximum
of the Lagrangian L(p, c, λ,q,y, z).
Given y and z, the dual problem of (2.1) is then minimizing (2.7) over Lagrange




The objective of the dual problem is differentiable at any point since the objective
function of the primal is strictly concave [50]. Hence, gradient descent iterations can
be applied to solve the dual.
Let λ(u) and q(u) respectively denote the values of λ and q at iteration u. Then
the gradients of D with respect to λ and q at this point are:
∂D
∂λ




= e + c(u)− (IN − Π
T )p(u),




0 if p˜i(u) < 0
p¯i if p˜i(u) > p¯i
p˜i(u) otherwise
(2.9)


































e+ c(u)− p(u) + ΠTp(u)
)]+
. (2.12)
where α and β are the step sizes, and [x]+ = max{0, x}. For fixed y and z, the
dual update will converge to the minimizer of D as u → ∞, if the step size is small
enough [52].
From (2.11), we notice that in order to update λ, ci is required from all the N
nodes. It means at each iteration u, each node should send ci(u) to a central node
which updates λ and send it back to every node in the system.
If node j is not a borrower of node i, then Πjipj(u) = 0; otherwise, Πjipj(u)
represents the amount of money that node j pays to node i at u-th iteration. Hence,
with the information of Πjipj(u) from all its borrowers, node i is able to update qi
based on (2.12).
2.2.3 A More Efficient Algorithm
As shown in Fig. 2.1, in the algorithm P first fixes y and z and solve (2.1) by
updating λ, q and p, c iteratively until they converge. Then we update y and z. This
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Fig. 2.1. Duality-based approach.
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is a two-stage iteration, which is likely to slow down the convergence of the entire
algorithm as too many dual updates are wasted for each fixed y and z [51]. To avoid
the two-stage iteration structure, we consider the following algorithm.
Algorithm A:
At the t-th iteration,
• A1) Fix y = y(t) and z = z(t), maximize L with respect to p and c,
[p(t), c(t)] = arg max
0≤p≤p¯,c≥0
L(p, c, λ(t),q(t),y(t), z(t)).











q(t + 1) =
[
q(t)− β(e+ c(t)− p(t) + ΠTp(t))
]+
. (2.14)
• A3) Update y and z with
[y(t + 1), z(t+ 1)] = arg max
0≤p≤p¯,c≥0
L(p, c, λ(t+ 1),q(t+ 1),y(t), z(t)).
In algorithm A, instead of an infinite number of dual updates, we only update La-
grange multipliers λ and q once for each fixed y and z. The following theorem
guarantees the convergence of algorithm A.
Theorem 7 Algorithm A will converge to the optimal solution of LP (1.4-1.8) pro-
vided the step sizes α and β are sufficiently small.
Theorem 7 is an extension of Proposition 4 in [53].
2.2.4 Implementation of Algorithm A
Assume Bi and Ci are the sets of borrowers and creditors of node i respectively.























Fig. 2.2. The t-th iteration of the distributed algorithm A for a fixed
maximum total amount of injected cash.
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0 if p˜i(t) < 0
p¯i if p˜i(t) > p¯i
p˜i(t) otherwise,


















Then send Πijpi(t) to every node j ∈ Ci, and send the updated ci(t) to node
Nc.
2. Each node i receives Πkipk(t) from every k ∈ Bi and updates qi:
qi(t + 1) =
[






Then each node i sends the updated qi(t + 1) to every node k ∈ Bi.










Then node Nc send the updated λ(t + 1) to every node i.
3. Every node i receives qj(t+1) from each j ∈ Ci and receives λ(t+1) from node
Nc, then updates yi and zi:
yi(t + 1) =


0 if y˜i(t+ 1) < 0
p¯i if y˜i(t+ 1) > p¯i
y˜i(t + 1) otherwise
where y˜i(t + 1) = yi(t) +
1
2
(wi − qi(t+ 1) +
∑
j∈Ci
qj(t + 1)Πij), and
zi(t+ 1) = [z˜i(t+ 1)]
+ ,
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where z˜i(t+ 1) = zi(t) +
1
2
(qi(t+ 1)− λ(t+ 1)).
Every node i then checks the conditions |y˜i(t+ 1)− y˜i(t)| < δ1 and |z˜i(t+ 1)−
z˜i(t)| < δ2. If both conditions hold, node i sets bi = 1; otherwise it sets bi = 0.
It then sends bi to the central node Nc. If bi = 1 for all i, then Nc directs all
nodes to terminate the algorithm.
These steps are illustrated in Fig. 2.2.
In Step 3, δ1 and δ2 are the stopping tolerances, which are usually set as small
positive numbers according to the accuracy requirement. We utilize y˜ and z˜ rather
than their projections y and z in the stopping criterion because the convergence of
y˜ and z˜ implies the convergence of the Lagrange multipliers q and λ, whereas the
convergence of y and z does not.
In the implementation of algorithmA, we include a central node. At each iteration
the central node has two functions. One is to sum the ci(t) and calculate λ(t + 1)
in Step 2; the other is to test whether bi = 1 for all nodes i in Step 3. For both
functions, the central node only collects a small amount of data and performs simple
calculations. We could entirely exclude the central node by calculating the sum of
ci(t) and communicating the stopping sign in a distributed way, at the cost of added
computational burden during each iteration.
2.3 The Alternative Formulation of Problem I
We now apply the duality-based distributed algorithm to LP (1.10), the alternative
formulation of Problem I. Note that now λ represents the importance of the injected
cash amount in the overall cost function. The algorithm is similar to Section 2.2
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except for the fact that λ is not updated at each iteration because λ is fixed and
given. Similar to (2.4), we define the Lagrangian as:
L(p, c,q,y, z) = wTp− λ1Tc− qT ((IN −Π



























The objective function of the dual problem is:
D(q,y, z) = max
0≤p≤p¯,c≥0
L(p, c,q,y, z)




The Lagrange multipliers q are updated by (2.14), where p and c maximize La-
grangian (2.15).
2.3.1 Implementation of Algorithm A′
Our algorithm for this problem is a simple modification of Algorithm A. We call
it Algorithm A′. Its t-th iteration is as follows.




0 if p˜i(t) < 0
p¯i if p˜i(t) > p¯i
p˜i(t) otherwise
where p˜i(t) = yi(t) +
1
2

































Fig. 2.3. The t-th iteration of the distributed algorithm A′ that in-
cludes optimizing the total amount of injected cash.
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2. Each node i receives Πkipk(t) from every k ∈ Bi and updates qi:
qi(t + 1) =
[






Then each node i sends the updated qi(t + 1) to every k ∈ Bi.
3. Each node i receives qj(t+ 1) from every j ∈ Ci and updates yi and zi:
yi(t + 1) =


0 if y˜i(t+ 1) < 0
p¯i if y˜i(t+ 1) > p¯i
y˜i(t + 1) otherwise
where y˜i(t + 1) = yi(t) +
1
2
(wi − qi(t+ 1) +
∑
j∈Ci
qj(t + 1)Πij), and
zi(t+ 1) = [z˜i(t+ 1)]
+ ,




Each node i checks the conditions |y˜i(t+1)−y˜i(t)| < δ1 and |z˜i(t+1)−z˜i(t)| < δ2.
If both conditions hold, it sets bi = 1; otherwise, it sets bi = 0. It then sends bi
to the central node Nc. If bi = 1 for all i then Nc asks all nodes to terminate
the algorithm.
These steps are illustrated in Fig. 2.3. Unlike the one in Algorithm A, the central
node does not need to collect ci at each iteration in Algorithm A
′.
2.4 Numerical Results
2.4.1 Example 1: A Four-Node Network
In this section, we illustrate the convergence of our distributed algorithm to the
optimal solution. We use the four-node network shown in Fig. 2.4(a). Node A owes
$50 to B and C, node B owes $20 to C, node C owes $80 to A, and node D owes $10
to C. Each node has $1 on hand. After all the clearing payments, the borrower-lender
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network reduces to Fig. 2.4(b). Without any external financial support, nodes A, C,
and D are in default, and the total amount of unpaid liability is $98. Assume that
wi = 0.45 for i = 1, 2, · · · , N in LP (1.4), i.e., that each dollar of unpaid liability
contributes 0.45 to the cost. Without any external cash injection, the value of the
cost function is 98× 0.45 = 44.1.
We first study Problem I, the case with a fixed maximum total amount of injected
cash. We assume that we can inject at most $15 into the system. We run our algorithm
with initial y(0) = z(0) = q(0) = 0 and λ = 0. The step size is α = β = 0.1, and the
stopping tolerance is δ1 = δ2 = 10
−6. Figs. 2.6(a) and 2.6(b) illustrate the evolution
of payment vector p and cash injection vector c, respectively, as a function of the
number of iterations of the proposed distributed algorithm. The payment vector
converges to [pA, pB, pC , pD] = [76, 20, 75, 10]; the cash injection vector converges to
[cA, cB, cC , cD] = [0, 0, 6.0, 9.0]. These are optimal, as verified by solving the LP (1.4-
1.8) directly. With external cash injection, the borrower-lender network reduces to
Fig. 2.5 after all the payments. Now the total unpaid liability is $29. Thus the value
of the cost due to unpaid liability after the optimal bailout is 29× 0.45 = 13.05.
Second, we test our algorithm on the alternative formulation of Problem I. In this
example, the initial settings are the same as in the previous example. In addition,
we fix the weight λ = 1. As shown in Fig. 2.8(a) and Fig. 2.8(b), the payment
vector converges to [pA, pB, pC , pD] = [81, 20, 80, 10], and the cash injection vector
converges to [cA, cB, cC , cD] = [0, 0, 8.5, 9.0]. These are optimal, as verified by solving
the LP (1.10) directly. With external cash injection, the borrower-lender network
reduces to Fig. 2.7 after all the payments. Now the total unpaid liability is $19, and
the cash injection amount is $17.5. Thus the value of the cost function after the
optimal bailout is 17.5 + 19 × 0.45 = 26.05. By injecting $17.5, we reduce the total
unpaid liability by $35.55, and we reduce the total cost by $35.55− $17.5 = $18.05.
We see from Fig. 2.7 that although A is still in default, in the optimal bailout
strategy we choose not to inject any cash in A. The reason is that if we inject some

























(b) Clearing without any bailout.











Fig. 2.5. Clearing in the network of Fig. 2.4 for the optimal allocation
of a $15 cash injection.










































(b) Cash injection vector.
Fig. 2.6. Evolution of the node payments and cash injections through
the iterations of the distributed algorithm for finding the optimal












Fig. 2.7. Clearing with the optimal bailout amount and allocation.










































(b) Cash injection vector.
Fig. 2.8. Evolution of the node payments and cash injections through
the iterations of the distributed algorithm that optimizes both the
amount and the allocation of the injected cash.
unpaid liability term of the cost function will be reduced by 0.45x, i.e., the value of
the overall cost function will actually increase by x− 0.45x = 0.55x.
2.4.2 Example 2: A Core-Periphery Network
In this section, we examine the practicality of our distributed algorithm. As in
Section 1.8, we assume that the US interbank network is well modeled as a core-
periphery network that consists of a core of 15 highly interconnected banks to which
most other banks connect [6]. We test the distributed algorithm for LP (1.10) on a
simulated core-periphery network illustrated in Fig. 1.17. The core network consists
of 15 fully connected core nodes. Each core node has 70 corresponding periphery
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Fig. 2.9. Number of iterations for the core-periphery network with δ1 = δ2 = 10
−7.
nodes which owe money only to this core node. For each pair of two core nodes i
and j, we set Lij as a random number uniformly distributed in [0, 10]. For a core
node i and its periphery node k, Lki is set to be uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. All
these obligation amounts are statistically independent. The asset vector is e = 0.
In addition, we assume wi = 0.3 for i = 1, 2, · · · , N , and λ = 1 in LP (1.10).
We generate 100 independent samples of a core-periphery network drawn from this
distribution. These samples thus all have the same topology but different amounts of
liabilities. We run the distributed algorithm of Section 2.3.1 with initial conditions
y(0) = z(0) = q(0) = 0. The step size is β = 0.01.
The stopping criterion for the distributed algorithm is max{‖y˜(t+1)−y˜(t)‖∞, ‖z˜(t+
1) − z˜(t)‖∞} < 10
−7. Let Td be the value of the total cost function W + λC calcu-
lated by our distributed algorithm, and let Tl be the corresponding value obtained
by solving the linear program directly, in a centralized fashion. Under this stopping
criterion, the relative error, defined as |Td − Tl|/Tl, is less than 10
−6 for each sample
in our simulations.
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The number of iterations is shown in Fig. 2.9. The average number of iterations
is 4.98× 105. Moreover, from Fig. 2.9, we can see that for most cases, the algorithm
terminates within 106 iterations.
The time spent on each iteration consists of two parts: the computing time and
the time it takes to convey messages between the nodes. During each iteration, a node
needs to transmit information to a set of neighbors twice: in Steps 1 and 2. Note
that in Step 3, the stopping sign bi is transmitted to the central node. However, it is
not necessary for a node to wait for the response before next iteration. Therefore, we
do not count it towards the communication delay during one iteration. It takes light
13.2ms to travel from LA to NYC, which is the longest possible distance between
two financial institutions within the continental US. So the propagation delay in one
iteration could be roughly estimated as 13.2ms× 2 = 26.4ms. Hence, for most cases,
the algorithm would terminate within 26.4ms× 106 = 7.3h, and the average running
time would be below 26.4ms × 4.98 × 105 = 3.65h. These running times would be
acceptable in applications where these computations are run overnight or during a
weekend. Note that the computation time at each node is negligible compared to
these communication times, and therefore we ignore it in these estimates.
Another possible set-up is that each institution provides a client-end computer
and we colocate these computers in one room. Assuming that the longest network
cable in this room is 100 meters, the propagation delay per iteration would be around
2 × 100/(3 × 108) = 6.67 × 10−7s. For the computing time, we just analyze the
core nodes because the periphery nodes have no borrowers and only one creditor so
that the computing time for the periphery nodes is much smaller than for the core
nodes. Usually, multiplications dominate the computing time. At each iteration, a
core node calculates qj(t)Πij , Πijpi(t), and qj(t + 1)Πij for all its creditors j. Since
the core network is a fully connected network with 15 core nodes, a core node has 14
creditors so that it does less than 50 multiplications per iteration. Assuming that each
multiplication takes 500 cpu cycles and the cpu on the client-end computer is 3GHz,
then the computing time per iteration is around 50× 500/(3× 109) = 8.33 × 10−6s.
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Fig. 2.10. Number of iterations for the core-periphery network with δ1 = δ2 = 10
−3.
Thus, for most cases, the algorithm terminates within (8.33× 10−6 + 6.67× 10−7)×
106 ≈ 10s. By colocating the client-end computers of all the financial institutions in
the system, we can significantly reduce the running time of our distributed algorithm
so that it can be easily run many times during a day.
In a monitoring application, our aim might be to calculate the payments ap-
proximately rather than exactly. In this case, the running time can be reduced by
relaxing the termination tolerance. We set the stopping criterion as max{‖y˜(t +
1) − y˜(t)‖∞, ‖z˜(t + 1) − z˜(t)‖∞} < 10
−3. Under this stopping criterion, the rela-
tive error, |Td − Tl|/Tl, is around 1% for each sample in our simulations. Fig. 2.10
illustrates the number of iterations. The average number is 4260. The number of
iterations is less than 10000 for most cases. By similar analysis, the average running
time for the non-colocated scenario is 26.4ms × 4260 ≈ 2min. For most cases, the
algorithm will be terminated within 26.4ms×104 ≈ 4.4min. If we colocate the client-
end computers of all the financial institutions, the algorithm will terminate within
(8.33× 10−6 + 6.67× 10−7)× 104 ≈ 0.1s.
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The above running time analysis is for the alternative formulation of Problem I,
in which λ is a constant. In Problem I, λ is a dual variable that also needs to
converge. So the running time of the distributed algorithm for Problem I will be
larger than the time for its alternative formulation. From Fig. 2.6 and Fig. 2.8,
we observe that with the same stopping tolerance, the number of iterations of the
distributed algorithm for Problem I is around 10 times the number of iterations for
its alternative formulation. Therefore, for Problem I, to calculate the exact payment
vector, the algorithm will terminate within around 70h for the non-colocated scenario
and within 100s for the colocated scenario. To obtain the payments within 1% error,
the algorithm will terminate within around 44min and 1s for the non-colocated and
colocated scenarios.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose a duality-based distributed algorithm to solve Prob-
lem I and its alternative formulation. The distributed algorithm is iterative and is
based on message passing between each node and its neighbors. No centralized gath-
ering of large amounts of data is required, and each participating institution avoids
revealing its proprietary book information to other institutions. The convergence and
the practicality of the distributed algorithm are both supported by our simulations.
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3. OPTIMAL MITIGATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK IN
FINANCIAL NETWORKS UNDER THE RANDOM
CAPITAL MODEL
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we assume that the external asset vector e is a determin-
istic vector known by the regulators. However, in some circumstances, the information
of the external assets may not be fully available to the regulator. Moreover, some
applications, such as stress testing, require forecasting and planning for a wide variety
of different contingencies. Such applications call for the use of stochastic models for
the nodes’ external asset values.
In this chapter, we aim to solve a stochastic version of Problem I under the
proportional payment mechanism: how to allocate a fixed amount of cash assistance
among the nodes in a financial network in order to minimize the expectation of the
(possibly weighted) sum of unpaid liabilities in the system.
We first prove that the optimal cash allocation strategy to minimize the expected
weighted sum of unpaid liabilities could be obtained by solving a two-stage stochastic
linear program. There exist efficient methods to obtain lower and upper bounds
for this stochastic linear program, but there is no guarantee that these bounds are
tight enough for practical guidelines. Thus, in the case that the bounds are loose, an
approximate solution is needed. Even if we assume that we know the joint distribution
of the external asset vector and are able to efficiently obtain independent samples
of this vector, it is not trivial to obtain the accurate solution for this stochastic
linear program due to the non-linear relationship between the weighted sum of unpaid
liabilities and the asset vector. The basic idea of solving the stochastic linear program
is to generate a large number of samples of the asset vector and utilize a large-scale
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deterministic linear program to approximate the stochastic linear program. In this
chapter, we propose two algorithms based on Monte Carlo sampling: the Benders
decomposition algorithm and the projected stochastic gradient descent algorithm.
First being proposed in [54], the Benders decomposition decomposes the large-
scale linear program into a group of small-scale linear programs and solves them iter-
atively. In this way, the computational complexity is highly reduced. The projected
stochastic gradient descent algorithm is an extension of gradient descent algorithm
developed in [55]. Instead of dealing with a huge number of samples at the same time,
we only take one sample at each iteration. We calculate the gradient of the weighted
sum of unpaid liabilities for that sample, with respect to the cash injection vector
and move the cash injection vector along the direction of the negative gradient. As
shown in [55], if the step size is selected properly, the procedure will converge to the
optimal cash vector, which minimizes the expectation of the weighted sum of unpaid
liabilities.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the random capital
model and shows that it is equivalent to a stochastic linear program. The upper
bounds and the lower bounds for the stochastic linear program are discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3. Section 3.4 adapts the Benders decomposition to solve the linear program.
In Section 3.5, we propose the projected stochastic gradient descent algorithm to solve
the stochastic linear program. Moreover, we verify the convergence of the projected
stochastic gradient descent algorithm on a five-node network for which the optimal
solution can be calculated explicitly, and also test the performance of the projected
stochastic gradient descent algorithm on a core-periphery network with the same size
as the US banking system.
3.2 Model and Notation
As mentioned in Section 3.1, some applications require forecasting and planning
for a wide variety of different contingencies. In this case, we aim to solve a stochastic
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version of Problem I where e is modeled as a random vector, from which we are able
to efficiently obtain independent samples. The remaining parameters—p¯, Π and w—
are still assumed to be deterministic and known, and are defined as in Section 1.2.
According to Lemma 1, the clearing payment vector that minimizes the weighted sum
of unpaid liabilities is a function of e and c, which we denote as p∗(e, c). If e is a
random vector, so is p∗(e, c). We use W ∗(e, c) to denote the corresponding minimum
value of the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities. If e is a random vector, then W ∗(e, c)
is a random variable. Given a total amount of cash C, our aim is to find the optimal
cash allocation strategy c to minimize the expectation of the weighted sum of unpaid









W ∗(e, c) = min
p
wT (p¯− p) (3.2)
subject to
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ e + c.
In this chapter, we use the notations in Chapter 1 as well as the following new
notations:
• Assume α is an index set of nodes 1, 2, . . . , N and v is a vector in RN , then vα
is a sub-vector of v containing elements in v with indices in α. For example, if
α = {1, 2, N}, then vα = [v1, v2, vN ]
T .
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• Assume α is an index set of nodes 1, 2, . . . , N and A is an N ×N matrix, then
Aα is a sub-matrix of A containing rows in A with index in α. If α contains M
indices, Aα is a M ×N matrix.
• Assume α, β are two index set of nodes 1, 2, . . . , N and A is an N ×N matrix,
then Aαβ is a sub-matrix of A containing rows in A with index in α and columns
in A with index in β. In other words, Aij would be an element in Aαβ if and
only if i ∈ α and j ∈ β. If α contains M1 indices and β contains M2 indices,
Aαβ is a M1 ×M2 matrix.
• IN is an N ×N identity matrix.
• ω is an index set containing all defaulting nodes; ω¯ is an index set containing
all non-defaulting nodes. |ω| is the number of elements in ω.
3.3 Upper Bounds and Lower Bounds
Even if the joint distribution of e is known, the distributions of p∗(e, c) and
W ∗(e, c) can rarely be computed in closed form. So for real-world problems, people
are inclined to solve a simpler version of the stochastic linear program as an estima-
tion, avoiding the computational difficulty.
One frequently used simpler version is to solve the deterministic linear program
obtained by replacing random vector e by its expected value. In [56], it is defined as
expected value problem, which is simply
EV = min
c
W ∗(E[e], c). (3.3)
Denote the optimal solution to LP (3.3) by c+, called the expected value solution.
Compared to the stochastic linear program, LP (3.3) is easy to solve. But generally,
c+ is not a good estimation of the solution of (3.1) with rare exceptions, such as when
W ∗(e, c) is linear with respect to e. In fact, EV is proved in [56] to be a lower bound
of SLP (3.1) by Jensen’s Inequality since W ∗(e, c) is convex with respect to e.
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The expected result of using the EV solution c+ is denoted:
EEV = Ee[W
∗(e, c+)]. (3.4)
It measures the performance of using c+ as an approximation of the solution to (3.1).
EEV is an upper bound to the solution of SLP (3.1).




W ∗(e, c)]. (3.5)
Intuitively, the wait-and-see solution WS is a lower bound of (3.1) because the regu-
lator waits until the random shock occurs and then takes actions. More information
leads to a better bailout strategy. Strict proof showing that this is a lower bound is
provided in [56].
It is proved that WS ≥ EV by Jensen’s Inequality in [56]. In other words, WS
is a tighter lower bound than EV .
3.4 Benders Decomposition
Although the expected value solution is easy to obtain, it is not a good approx-
imation in general. Thus, there is an acute need for other approximate solutions,
which are both tractable and accurate. In order to solve (3.1), we take M indepen-






∗(e, c)]. By the weak law of large numbers, when M is large
enough, the sample average is a good estimate of Ee[W
∗(e, c)]. This motivates ap-












Similar to Theorem 1, the optimization problems (3.2) and (3.6) can be combined









0 ≤ pm ≤ p¯, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M,
pm ≤ ΠTpm + em + c, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M.
Since c and pm for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M are all N -dimensional vectors, LP (3.7) contains
MN +N variables. The computational complexity of solving an LP with MN +N
variables is O((MN +N)3) [57]. To achieve a high accuracy, M needs to be a large
number. Then the computational burden is large if we want to solve LP (3.7) directly.
The memory complexity, which is O(MN2), may also be prohibitive for large M and
N . Hence, efficient algorithms to solve LP (3.7) are needed.
If the cash injection vector c is fixed, then the LP (3.7) can be split into M
smaller independent LPs—one for each sample em—each of which can be solved
independently for each pm. In this case, instead of solving an LP with MN variables,
we solve M LPs with N variables each, which significantly reduces the computational
complexity. Inspired by this idea, we apply Benders decomposition to the LP (3.7).
Benders decomposition, which is described in [54, 58, 59], makes a partition of c and
pm (m = 1, 2, . . . ,M) and allows us to find pm iteratively with fixed c in each step.
In fact, for our problem, Benders decomposition can be further simplified due to some
special properties of (3.7).
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From the proof of Lemma 1, we know that for any fixed c, the feasible region of














pm ≥ 0, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M,
pm ≤ p¯, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M, (3.10)
pm ≤ ΠTpm + em + c, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M. (3.11)
We let µ1, . . . ,µM be the dual variables for the M constraints (3.10), and we let
ν
1, . . . ,νM be the dual variables for the M constraints (3.11). Then V (c) can be
obtained from the following dual problem:










m ≥ 0, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M,
ν
m ≥ 0, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M,
ν
m ≥ Πνm +w − µm, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M.
Note that, since V (c) minimizes the objective function of LP (3.12) subject to the con-
straints of LP (3.12), we have that V (c) is the greatest lower bound of this objective
function, subject to these constraints. Therefore, LP (3.8) is equivalently rewritten as
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the maximization of the lower bound to the objective function of LP (3.12), subject











p¯Tµm + emTνm + cTνm
]
(3.14)
for all (µm,νm) in the feasible region of (3.12).
LP (3.13) is equivalent to (3.7), with fewer variables but an infinite number of con-
straints because constraint (3.14) must be satisfied by every pair (µm,νm) from the
feasible region of LP (3.12). The key idea is solving a relaxed version of (3.13) by
ignoring all but a few of the constraints (3.14). Assume the optimal solution of this
relaxed program is (c∗, θ∗). If the solution satisfies all the ignored constraints, the
optimal solution has been found; otherwise, we generate a new constraint by solving
(3.12) with fixed c = c∗ and add it to the relaxed problem. Here is the summary of
the Benders decomposition algorithm:
1. Initialization: set θ0 ← −∞, K ← 0, c0 ← 0, l ← 0.
2. Fix cl, solve the following M sub-programs for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M :









m ≥ 0, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M,
ν
m ≥ 0, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M,
ν
m ≥ Πνm +w− µm, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M.





V m = θl, terminate and cl is the optimal.
4. Set l ← l+1, K ← K+1, (µm(K),νm(K))← (µm∗,νm∗), for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M .











p¯Tµ(k)m + emTν(k)m + cTν(k)m
]
for k = 1, 2, . . . , K.
Denote the solution as (c∗, θ∗). Set θl ← θ∗, cl ← c∗. Then go to Step 2.
In this algorithm, at each iteration, we solve M +1 LPs with N variables instead
of one LP with MN +N variables, which saves both computational complexity and
memory cost. The above algorithm is simpler than the general form of Benders
decomposition (Section 2.3 in [58]), since LP (3.9) and (3.15) are always feasible and
bounded.
3.5 Projected Stochastic Gradient Descent Algorithm
In this section, we introduce the projected stochastic gradient descent algorithm
(PSGD) to solve (3.1). This is an online learning algorithm, which allows us to handle
one sample at a time, without building a huge linear program. The basic idea is that
for each sample em, we move the solution c along the direction of the negative gradient
of W ∗(em, c) with respect to c and then project the result onto the set defined by
the constraints of (3.1). This procedure will converge to the optimal solution if the
step size is selected properly [55]. In practice, the regulator usually fully utilizes the
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budget, so in this section, we just consider 1Tc = C to speed up the convergence and
facilitate the projection. The algorithm proceeds as follows. At iteration m,
1. Sample an asset vector em.
2. Move c along the negative gradient of W ∗(em, cm−1) according to the following
equation:
c˜m = cm−1 − γm∇cW
∗(em, cm−1). (3.16)
3. Set cm as the projection of c˜m onto the set {c : 1Tc = C, c ≥ 0}.







γm =∞. Thus, a proper choice could be γm = 1/m.
In this projected stochastic gradient descent algorithm, instead of generating a
huge number of possible scenarios and solving a large-scale linear program, we solve
one N -variable LP and one N -variable quadratic program at each iteration. This
algorithm is memory efficient because it requires no storage except the current solution
of c.
Now we discuss the details in the above algorithm: obtaining the gradient in Step
2, calculating the projection in Step 3 and the stopping criterion for the iterations.
Note that W ∗(em, cm−1) = wT p¯− U(em, cm−1), where




0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ em + cm−1.












ν ≥ Πν +w − µ.
Assuming that (µ∗,ν∗) is a solution of (3.18), we have:
∇cW
∗(em, cm−1) = −∇cU(e
m, cm−1) = −ν∗.
Generally, an LP solver is needed to obtain the gradient. In this case, however,
since we only need ν, not µ, there is an easier way to find ν, which avoids wasting
time on environment setting, problem establishment and algorithm selection in the
LP solver.
First, we calculate the clearing payment vector in the financial system given the
asset vector em and the cash injection vector cm−1 by the fixed-point method in
Appendix A. Then we separate the nodes into two groups: defaulting nodes and
non-defaulting nodes. For non-defaulting nodes, they pay their liabilities in full so
injecting more cash into these nodes will not change the weighted sum of unpaid
liabilities. In other words, the derivatives with respect to cash injection into non-
defaulting nodes are all zero. For defaulting nodes, their payments will increase if
they receive more external cash injections. Thus, the derivatives with respect to cash
injection into defaulting nodes are non-zeros and could be obtained via the following
theorem.
Theorem 8 Assume that the liabilities matrix L and the weight vector w are fixed
and known. The asset vector is em, and the cash injection vector is cm−1. Assume
that the system utilizes the proportional payment mechanism with no bankruptcy costs.
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Using the model and notations defined in Section 1.2, the gradient of the weighted sum
















Proof According to proportional payment mechanism with no bankruptcy costs,
the non-defaulting nodes in index set ω pay their liabilities in full and the defaulting
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From Eq. (3.20), we have
pω = (I|ω| − (Π
T )ωω)





Thus, the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities in the financial system given the asset
vector em and the cash injection vector cm−1 can be calculated directly by follows:
W ∗(em, cm−1) = wT (p¯− p)
= wTω¯ (p¯ω¯ − pω¯) +w
T
ω (p¯ω − pω)
= wTω (p¯ω¯ − (I|ω| − (Π
T )ωω)





From Eq. (3.21), we have:
∇cω¯W
∗(em, cm−1) = 0,
∇cωW




In Step 3, we find the projection of c˜m on the feasible region. This could be done





1Tc = C, (3.23)
c ≥ 0. (3.24)
But, once again, there is a simpler algorithm to solve Eq. (3.22) with a O(N)




i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where κ is a scalar that needs to be adjusted so that 1Tc = C.
If c˜m ≥ 0 and 1T c˜m = C, then c˜m locates in the feasible region of quadratic pro-
gram (3.22) and the optimal solution is c = c˜m. If c˜m violates the constraints (3.23),
i.e., 1T c˜m 6= C, we simplify the quadratic problem by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions.
Let a scalar κ and an N × 1 vector ι be Lagrange multipliers for constraint (3.23)
and (3.24), respectively. We define the Lagrangian as follows:
F (c, κ, ι) = ‖c− c˜m‖22 + κ(1
Tc− C)− ιT c (3.25)
Then the primal and dual optimal c and (κ, ι) will satisfy the following KKT
conditions:
∇cF (c, κ, ι) = 0, (3.26)
1Tc = C, (3.27)
c ≥ 0, (3.28)
ι ≥ 0, (3.29)
ιici = 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (3.30)
From KKT constraint (3.26), we have ci = c˜
m
i − κ/2 + ιi/2, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
• If c˜mi − κ/2 > 0, then ci > 0 since ιi ≥ 0. By KKT constraint (3.30), ιi = 0.




• If c˜mi − κ/2 < 0, ιi should be positive to guarantee that ci ≥ 0. Since ιici = 0
and ιi > 0, we conclude ci = 0.
• If c˜mi − κ/2 = 0, then ci = ιi/2. Since ιici = 0, we have ci = ιi = 0.
Thus, ci = max{c˜
m
i − κ/2, 0}, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Then combined with KKT constraint (3.27), the problem becomes to find a non-
zero scalar κ making 1Tc = C, where ci = max{c˜
m
i −κ/2, 0}, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . This
is a typical single water-level and single constrained water filling problem which can
be solved with complexity O(N) [60]. A variety of both iterative and exact algorithms
are provided in [61–65]. Here, we just list one of them to find c:
1. k ← 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , c0i ← c˜
m
i .
2. If 1Tck = C, c← ck, stop.
3. If 1Tck < C, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
ci ← c
k
i + (C − 1
Tck)/N,
stop.






Tck − C)/Z, 0},
go to Step 2.
For the stopping criterion for such iterative algorithm, we usually compare the
current cash injection vector c and the one in the last iteration. If they are close
enough, we terminate the iterations. However, in PSGD, since at each iteration the
asset vector e is chosen randomly, it is possible that the stopping condition is satisfied
by coincidence before the sequence of c converges. To reduce the probability of such
coincidence, we define a stopping condition window S and instead of just considering
one iteration, we check S consecutive iterations. The new stopping criterion requires
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that the differences between a cash injection vector and the subsequent one are all
small enough for S consecutive iterations. In other words, if at iteration m > S, for
s = 1, 2, . . . , S, ‖cm−s+1 − cm−s‖1 < δ, the algorithm will be terminated. Here, δ is a
small number.
3.5.1 Importance Sampling
Sometimes, the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities will significantly change when
the random asset vector e locates in a certain region, called important region. If the
probability of getting samples in the important region is too small, we may need a
large number of samples to make sure that we get enough samples in that region. In
order to solve this problem and improve the performance of the projected stochastic
gradient descent algorithm, we could apply importance sampling.
The basic idea of importance sampling is to change the probability measure of
the random variables to make the probability of getting samples in important region
larger. In this paper, our objective is to calculate the expectation of the weighted sum
of unpaid liabilities W ∗(e, c) where e is a random vector under the original measure
P1. We could calculate the expectation under a new measure P2, which emphasizes

















where f1(e) is the pdf of e under measure P1 and f2(e) is the pdf of e under the new
measure P2. If P2 is selected properly, the regulator may need less samples to achieve
the same accuracy.
To sum up, before using the projected stochastic gradient descent algorithm, the
regulator should identify the pathological samples that could potentially cause sig-
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nificant unpaid liabilities; increase their sampling probability, and then adjust the
formula of the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities accordingly.














Fig. 3.1. An example illustrating the power of importance sampling.
For example, in Fig. 3.1, there are 202 nodes. Node 1 owes $10 to node 2, node 2
owes $10 to node 3, ..., node 200 owes $10 to node 201 and node 202 owes $10 to node
200. Node 201 has $9 on hand and the asset of node 1 is uniformly distributed in
[9, 109]. All other nodes have no cash on hand. We assume w = 1 and the regulator
has $1 to be injected to the network. Without cash injection, node 201 is safe and
node 202 will default with unpaid liability $1. If the asset of node 1 is greater than
or equal to $10, node 1 to node 200 are all safe; if the asset of node 1 is less than $10,
all of them will default, causing a total unpaid liability of 200(10 − e1), where e1 is
the asset value of node 1. In other words, without cash injection, node 202 will result
in $1 unpaid liability, while nodes 1 to 200 will be safe with probability 99% and will
result in a large total unpaid liabilities with probability 1%. The regulator should
only consider to inject cash into node 1 and node 202 since node 2 to 200 could get
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money from node 1. Assume we inject $c to node 1 and $(1 − c) to node 202, then
the expected total unpaid liability is as follows:
EP1 [W
∗(e, c)]
= EP1{200× [10− (e1 + c)]










+ [10− (9 + 1− c)]+
= c2 − c+ 1
EP1 [W
∗(e, c)] is minimum when c = 0.5. Thus, the optimal allocation strategy is
injecting $0.5 to node 1 and $0.5 to node 202.
When we apply the projected stochastic gradient descent algorithm on this net-
work, we only have 1% of samples for e1 in [9, 10], which leads to a large amount of
unpaid liabilities. The other 99% of the samples result in nodes 1 to 200 being safe
so that the regulator inclines towards node 202 based on the algorithm. Thus, the
algorithm will either converge to injecting $1 to node 202 or require a large number
of samples to achieve the global optimum.
In order to make the projected stochastic gradient descent algorithm more efficient,
we apply importance sampling on node 1. We define a new probability measure P2,
where e1 is 1/2 in [9, 10] and 1/198 in [10, 109]. Then the expected weighted sum of





200× [10− (e1 + c)]
+
]









+ [10− (e202 + 1− c)]
+
= c2 − c+ 1.
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We can see that under the new measure the expectation remains the same but the
speed of convergence is improved since we get more samples of e1 in the important
region [9, 10].
3.5.2 Numerical Results
In this section, we test the performance of the projected stochastic gradient descent
algorithm on two examples: a five-node network for which the optimal solution can be
calculated explicitly and a large scale core-periphery network which has a comparable
size with the US banking system.
3.5.2.1 Example 1: A Five-Node Network
First, we illustrate the convergence of PSGD to the optimal solution on a five-
node network example, for which the optimal solution of the 2-stage stochastic linear
program can be calculated directly. Also, we show that in this example, the expected
value solution defined in Eq. (3.4) is not a good approximation to the optimum.







Fig. 3.2. A five-node financial network.
Consider the borrower-lender network in Fig. 3.2, where node Ni owes $10 to
Ni+1 for i = 1, 2, 3, and node N5 owes $10 to node N4. Nodes N2, N3 and N4 have no
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cash on hand, while nodes N1 and N5 have assets are uniformly and independently
distributed in [8, 12] and [6, 10], respectively. Assume we have $2 to be injected into
the system. We are seeking the optimal cash allocation vector c to minimize the
expected weighted sum of unpaid liabilities, Ee[W
∗(e, c)]. All liabilities have the
same weight (w = 1).
First, we consider the expected value solution, which is easy to obtain. When the
asset vector is E[e], N1 has $10 on hand. It is able to pay its liability in full and so
are N2 and N3. On the other hand, N5 only has $8 on hand. The expected value
solution injects all $2 to node N5 so that all nodes can avoid default. However, there
is no reason to believe that this solution is in any way near the optimum. Intuitively,
we should inject some cash to node N1 because once N1 cannot afford its liability
(e1 < 10), both N2 and N3 will default. It leads to a more severe shock than the
default of N5.
In fact, the optimal solution can be calculated explicitly for the network in Fig. 3.2.
Since nodes N2 and N3 could get money from N1 and node N4 has zero liability, $2
should be split into N1 and N5, while other three nodes receive nothing. Assume we
inject c1 into N1 and c5 into N5, the funds available to make payment of N1 is e1+ c1
and the funds available to make payment of N5 is e5 + c5. Then the weighted sum of
unpaid liabilities in this network is:
W ∗[e, c] = 3× [10− (e1 + c1)]
+ + [10− (e5 + c5)]
+
where [x]+ = max{0, x}.
Since e1 is a random variable uniformly distributed in [8, 12] and e5 is uniform in




= Ee{3× [10− (e1 + c1)]












Considering that c1 + c5 = 2, we find that the minimum of Ee[W
∗(e, c)] is achieved
at c1 = c5 = 1 and the minimum value of the expectation is $1.5. We could see that
the optimum is far away from the expected value solution, where c1 = 0, c5 = 2 and
the expectation is $2.
We run PSGD on the five-node network with initial c = 0. The step size is
γ = 1/m, where m is the number of iterations. The stopping condition window S = 5
and the tolerance δ = 10−5.


























Fig. 3.3. Evolution of the cash injections through the iterations of
PSGD for finding the optimal allocation of a $2 cash injection into
the network of Fig. 3.2.
Fig. 3.3 illustrates the evolution of cash injection vector c, as a function of the
number of iterations of PSGD. The cash injection vector c converges to
[0.9958, 0.0002, 0.0001, 0, 1.0037], which is close to the theoretical optimum [1, 0, 0, 0, 1].
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3.5.2.2 Example 2: A Core-Periphery Network
A variety of prior literature, e.g. [6], suggests that the US interbank network is
well modeled as a core-periphery network that consists of a core of about 15 highly
interconnected banks to which most other banks connect. Therefore, we test PSGD
on the core-periphery network shown in Fig. 1.17. It contains 15 fully connected core
nodes with 70 periphery nodes each. Each periphery node has a single link pointing
to the corresponding core node. All the obligation amounts Li,j are independent and
uniformly distributed in [0, 10] if i and j are a pair of core nodes, and in [0, 1] if i is
a periphery node and j is a core node. We generate ten independent samples of a
core-periphery network drawn from this distribution. For each sample, the external
assets of each node is uniformly distributed in [0, 0.2], independently across all nodes.
All these samples have the same topology and the same distribution for e, but the
liabilities are fixed and different. The weight vector is w = 1 and the amount of cash
to be injected into the system is C = 300.
In PSGD, we set the initial cash injection vector to c = 0. The step size is
γ = 1/m, where m is the iteration number. The stopping condition window is S = 5
and the tolerance δ = 10−5.
The optimal solution for such a large-scale and complex network is generally in-
tractable. Thus, we compare our results with the expected value solution, the upper
bound defined in Eq. (3.4) and with the expected value EV , the lower bound defined
in Eq. (3.3). Moreover, to test the robustness of PSGD, we run the algorithm twice
with two different sequences of asset vector e. The results should be close to each
other if the performance of PSGD is stable and robust.
To sum up, we compare four results: the expected value EV in Eq. (3.3), two
PSGD solutions found with different sequences of asset vectors (testing data) and the
expected value solution defined in Eq. (3.4). We generate another 1000 independent
asset vectors under the same distribution as test data and use their average weighted
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Fig. 3.4. Comparison of the expected value, two PSGD solutions and
the expected value solution.
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sum of unpaid liabilities to evaluate performance each of the three cash injection
vectors.
Finally, we generate ten samples of random core-periphery networks and run
PSGD on them. The average weighted sum of unpaid liabilities of the test data
for the three cash injection vectors and the expected value EV are shown in Fig 3.4.
For all ten networks, we could see that the performance of the two cash injection vec-
tors calculated by PSGD with different random sequences of asset vectors are almost
the same, which indicates that PSGD performs stably although it involves random
samples. Furthermore, the results from PSGD are better than the results from the
expected value solution, performing close to the lower bound EV .
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we consider the situation where the capital of institutions at
maturity is a random vector with known distribution. We develop a stochastic lin-
ear program to find the cash injection policy that minimizes the expectation of the
weighted sum of unpaid liabilities. We discuss some efficient methods to obtain up-
per bounds and lower bounds for this expectation. For the cases that the bounds
are loose, we have proposed two algorithms based on Monte Carlo sampling: Benders
decomposition algorithm and projected stochastic gradient descent. We verify the
convergence of the projected stochastic gradient descent algorithm by testing it on a
five-node network for which the optimal solution can be calculated directly. We also
test the performance of the projected stochastic gradient descent algorithm by com-
paring its result with the upper bound and lower bound on a core-periphery network
with comparable size to the US banking system.
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4. SUMMARY
In this thesis, we study the optimal monitoring and mitigation of systemic risk in
financial networks. For various practical applications, we consider different models,
objectives and as a result, adopt different methodologies for the design of proper
algorithms.
First, we consider a one-period, single maturity deterministic model, all loans have
the same maturity date and the same seniority. Given that the network structure is
fixed and known by the regulators, we aim to find the optimal bailout strategies
to minimize the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities. With zero bankruptcy cost, we
show that this problem is equivalent to a linear program, which can be solved by
any standard LP solver efficiently. In addition, we consider three extensions of our
model by adding to it various features that characterize real-world lending networks.
The first one is allowing the obligations in the network to have multiple seniorities;
the second one is incorporating credit default swaps into our model and the third
one is assuming the defaulting nodes do not pay at all, i.e., the bankruptcy cost is
one hundred percents. We show that with each of these extensions, the problem of
minimizing the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities is a mixed-integer linear program.
Second, we investigate how to minimize the number of defaults in the system. We
propose two heuristic algorithms: the reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm and the
greedy algorithm. We illustrate our algorithms using examples with synthetic data
for which the optimal solution can be calculated exactly. We show through numerical
simulations that the solutions calculated by the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm are close
to optimal, and that the performance of the greedy algorithm highly depends on the
network topology. We also compare these two algorithms using three types of random
networks for which the optimal solution is not available.
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For the scenarios that centralized gathering all the data of the entire lending
network is impractical, we develop a duality-based distributed algorithm to find the
optimal cash allocation to minimize the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities when the
bankruptcy cost is zero. The algorithm is iterative and is based on message passing
between each node and its neighbors. During each iteration of the algorithm, each
node only needs to receive a small amount of data from its neighbors, perform simple
calculations, and transmit a small amount of data to its neighbors. Simulations verify
the convergence and the practicality of the algorithm.
Some applications, such as stress testing, require forecasting and planning for a
wide variety of different contingencies. For such applications, we further consider
a stochastic model where the external assets of financial institutions are random
variables of which the joint distribution is known and fixed. We show that the optimal
cash allocation could be calculated by a two-stage stochastic linear program. To solve
this problem we develop two algorithms based on Monte Carlo sampling: the Benders
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A. COMPARISON OF THREE ALGORITHMS FOR
COMPUTING THE CLEARING PAYMENT VECTOR
A.1 Proportional Payment Mechanism
In [1], zero bankruptcy costs are assumed, and three methods of finding the clear-
ing payment vector are proposed: a fixed-point algorithm, the fictitious default algo-
rithm and an optimization method. In this section, we first introduce and analyze
these three methods and then compare their computation times under different net-
work topologies.
A.1.1 Fixed-Point Algorithm
By definition, the clearing payment vector is a fixed point of the following map:
Φ(p) = min{(ΠTp+ e), p¯}.
where the minimum of the two vectors is component-wise. Under certain mild as-
sumptions specified in [1], the fixed point is unique. It can be found iteratively via
the following algorithm [1].
Fixed-point algorithm:
1. Initialization: set p0 ← p¯, k ← 0, and set the stopping tolerance δ0 to a small
positive number based on the accuracy requirement.
2. pk+1 ← Φ(pk).
3. If ‖pk+1 − pk‖∞ < δ0, stop and output the clearing payment vector p
k+1; else,
set k ← k + 1 and go to Step 2.
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At each iteration, the computational complexity is dominated by ΠTp, which is
Θ(N2). The number of iterations is highly dependent on the network topology and
the amounts of liabilities.
A.1.2 Fictitious Default Algorithm
The fictitious default algorithm is proposed in Section 3.1 in [1]. The basic idea is
to first assume that all the nodes pay their liabilities in full. If, under this assumption,
every node has enough funds to pay in full, then the algorithm terminates. If some
nodes do not have enough funds to pay in full, it means that these nodes would default
even if all the other nodes pay in full. Such defaults that are identified during the
first iteration of the algorithm are called first-order defaults. In the second iteration,
we assume that only the first-order defaults occur. Every non-defaulting node k




Πjipj + ei. If there is no new defaulting nodes during this second iteration,
then the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise, the new defaulting nodes are called
second-order defaults, and we proceed to the third iteration. In the third iteration we
assume that both the first-order and second-order defaults occur. We calculate the
new payment vector and again check the set of defaulting nodes. We keep iterating
until no new defaults occur. Since there are N nodes in the system, this algorithm
is guaranteed to terminate within N iterations. The specifics of the fictitious default
algorithm are as follows.
Fictitious default algorithm:
1. Initialization: p1 ← p¯, k ← 1, and D(0) ← ∅.









j + ei − p¯i
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4. If D(k) = D(k−1), terminate.
5. Otherwise, set p
(k+1)
i ← p¯i for all i 6∈ D
(k). For all i ∈ D(k), compute the
payments p
(k+1)
i by solving the following system of equations:
p
(k+1)








Πjip¯j, for all i ∈ D
(k)
6. Set k ← k + 1 and go to Step 2.
At each iteration of the fictitious default algorithm, the computational complexity
is dominated by solving the linear equations in Step 5. The number of unknowns in
these equations and the number of equations are both equal to the number of elements
in D(k). In the worst case, the number of defaulting nodes in the system is of the same
order as N . In this case the computational complexity per iteration is O(N3) [57].
Compared to the fixed-point algorithm, the fictitious default algorithm has a larger
computational complexity per iteration, and, as shown below in Section A.1.4, larger
running times on several network topologies. However, the advantage of the fictitious
default algorithm is that it is guaranteed to terminate within N iterations. Moreover,
the fictitious default algorithm will produce the exact value of clearing payment,
unlike the fixed-point algorithm which produces an approximation.
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Table A.1.
Comparison of the running times for the computation of the clear-
ing payment vector under the proportional payment mechanism us-
ing the fixed-point algorithm, fictitious default algorithm, and linear
programming.
FP algorithm FD algorithm LP method
ave (s) stdev ave (s) stdev ave (s) stdev
fully connected 0.9128 0.1045 10.7341 0.7182 53.1725 11.8947
core-periphery 0.0869 0.0342 7.8213 1.2843 0.1964 0.0507
linear chain 0.0462 0.0170 10.2574 1.0211 0.1610 0.0449





Tp, which is a strictly increasing function of p. By






0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ e.
The computational complexity of solving an LP is O(N3) [57].
A.1.4 Comparison of Running Times on Three Different Topologies
We calculate the clearing payment vector via the above three methods on three
different network topologies and compare the running times. The first network topol-
ogy is a fully connected network with 1000 nodes. All the obligation amounts Lij and
asset amounts ei are independent random variables, uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
The second network topology is a core-periphery network shown in Fig. 1.17. It con-
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tains 15 fully connected core nodes. Each core node has 70 periphery nodes. Each
periphery node has a single link pointing to the corresponding core node. All the obli-
gation amounts Li,j are independent uniform random variables. For each pair of core
nodes i and j the obligation amount Lij is uniformly distributed in [0, 10]. For a core
node i and its periphery node k, the obligation amount Lki is uniformly distributed in
[0, 1]. The asset amounts ei are uniformly distributed in [0, 0.25]. The third network
topology is a long linear chain network with 1000 nodes. For i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, the
obligation amount Li(i+1) is uniformly distributed in [0, 10], and for other pairs of i
and j, Lij = 0. The asset amounts ei are uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
For each type of network, we generate 100 samples. We run the Matlab code
on a personal computer with a 2.66GHz Intel Core2 Duo Processor P8800. The
average running times and the sample standard deviations of the running times for
the three methods are shown in Table A.1. For all three types of networks, the fixed-
point algorithm is the most efficient one. Note that the computation time of linear
program method is highly variable because simpler topologies result in Π being a
sparse matrix, reducing the running time.
A.2 All-or-Nothing Payment Mechanism
A.2.1 Fixed-Point Algorithm and Fictitious Default Algorithm
We now assume the all-or-nothing payment mechanism where node i pays p¯i if it
is solvent and pays nothing if it defaults. Therefore, the clearing payment vector is a







Πjipj + ei ≥ p¯i
0 otherwise
We find the fixed point of Ψ(·) iteratively via the following algorithm.
Fixed-point algorithm:
1. Initialization: set p0 ← p¯, k ← 0.
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2. pk+1 ← Ψ(pk).
3. If pk+1 = pk, stop and output the clearing payment vector pk+1; else, set k ←
k + 1 and go to Step 2.
In fact, under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, this fixed-point algorithm
can be interpreted as the following fictitious default algorithm. We initially assume
that all the nodes pay their liabilities in full, i.e., p0 = p¯. If, under this assumption,
every node has enough funds to pay in full, then the algorithm terminates. If some
nodes do not have enough funds to pay in full, it means that these nodes would default
even if all the other nodes pay in full. We define these nodes as first-order defaults.
With function Ψ(·), we identify the first-order defaults and set their payments to
zero. In the second iteration, we assume that only the first-order defaults occur.
Every non-defaulting node k pays in full, i.e., pk = p¯k; every defaulting node i pays
0, i.e., pi = 0. Again, with function Ψ(·), we identify the new defaulting nodes, which
are called second-order defaults, and set their payments to zero. If there are no such
new defaulting nodes, the algorithm terminates; otherwise, we proceed to the third
iteration. We keep iterating until no new defaults occur, i.e., pk+1 = pk.
Since there are N nodes in the system, this algorithm is guaranteed to terminate
within N iterations. At each iteration, the computational complexity is dominated
by ΠTp, which is Θ(N2). Therefore, the computational complexity of the fixed-point
algorithm (fictitious default algorithm) is O(N3).
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A.2.2 Mixed-Integer Linear Programming Method
The clearing payment vector can also be obtained by solving MILP (1.49) with
the assumption that no external cash would be injected, i.e., C = 0. With C = 0,









Πjipj − ei ≤ p¯idi, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
di ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
We solve MILP (A.2) via CVX [2, 3].
A.2.3 Comparison of Running Times on Three Different Topologies
We calculate the clearing payment vector under the all-or-nothing payment mech-
anism via the above two methods on three network topologies described in Sec-
tion A.1.4, and compare the running times.
Similar to Section A.1.4, we generate 100 samples and run the Matlab code on
a personal computer with a 2.66GHz Intel Core2 Duo Processor P8800. The aver-
age running times and the sample standard deviations of the running times for the
two methods are shown in Table A.2. For all the three topologies, the fixed-point
algorithm is significantly more efficient than the MILP method.
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Table A.2.
Comparison of the running times for the computation of the clearing
payment vector under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism using
the fixed-point algorithm and mixed-integer linear programming.
FP algorithm / FD algorithm MILP
ave (s) stdev ave (s) stdev
fully connected 0.0092 0.0129 1.2204 0.0909
core-periphery 0.0242 0.0175 0.5338 0.0255
linear chain 0.0279 0.0149 0.4700 0.0276
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B. CVX CODE
B.1 CVX code for MILP (1.11)
Below is the CVX code to solve MILP (1.11). The parameters that appear in the
code are defined in Table B.1.
c vx so l v e r mosek
cvx beg in
va r i ab l e u (K, N)
va r i ab l e c (N) % cash i n j e c t i o n vec to r
va r i ab l e d (K, N) binary
maximize (sum(w’ . ∗sum(u .∗sum(L , 3 ) , 1 ) ) )
sub j e c t to
sum( c ) <= C tota l
c >= 0
0 <= u <= 1
for i = 1 :N
sum(sum(u .∗L ( : , : , i ) ) ) + e ( i ) + c ( i ) >= . . .
sum(u ( : , i ) . ∗ sum( reshape (L ( : , i , : ) , K, N) , 2 ) )
end
d <= u
for i = 1 :K−1





Parameters in CVX codes for MILP (1.11).
Parameters in CVX codes Notation in Section 1.4
L L









B.2 CVX code for MILP (1.35)
Below is the CVX code to solve MILP (1.35). The parameters that appear in the
code are defined in Table B.2.
c vx so l v e r gurobi
cvx beg in
va r i ab l e x (N)
va r i ab l e y (Nc)
va r i ab l e z (N)
va r i ab l e ys (Nc∗N)
va r i ab l e f (N)
va r i ab l e r (N)
va r i ab l e d (N) binary
va r i ab l e d cds (Nc) binary
va r i ab l e c (N)
maximize sum(sum(L , 2 ) . ∗ ( x+z ) ) + . . .
sum(sum(D, 2 ) . ∗ ys ) . . .
− sum( reshape (sum(D, 2 ) ,Nc ,N) , 1 )∗d
sub j e c t to
% con s t r a i n t s f o r cash i n j e c t i o n vec to r
sum( c ) <= C tota l
c >= 0
% con s t r a i n t s in Step 1
0 <= x <= 1
sum(L , 2) .∗ x <= L’ ∗ x + e + c
L ’ ∗ x + e + c − sum(L , 2) .∗ x <= (1 − d) / eps
1 − d <= x
1 − x >= eps ∗ d
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% con s t r a i n t s in Step 2
f == L ’ ∗ x + e + c − sum(L , 2) .∗ x
for i = 1 :Nc
ys ( ( 0 :N−1)∗Nc+i ) <= d
y( i ) − ys ( ( 0 :N−1)∗Nc+i ) <= 1 − d
ys ( ( 0 :N−1)∗Nc+i ) − y ( i ) <= 1 − d
end
sum( reshape (sum(D, 2 ) . ∗ ys ,Nc ,N) , 2 ) <= . . .
D’ ∗ ys + f ( 1 :Nc)
D’ ∗ ys + f ( 1 :Nc) − . . .
sum( reshape (sum(D, 2 ) . ∗ ys ,Nc ,N) , 2 ) . . .
<= (1 − d cds ) / eps
r ( 1 : Nc) == D’ ∗ ys + f ( 1 : Nc) − . . .
sum( reshape (sum(D, 2 ) . ∗ ys ,Nc ,N) , 2 )
r (Nc+1:N) == f (Nc+1:N)
1 − d cds <= y
% con s t r a i n t s in Step 3
0 <= z <= 1 − x




Parameters in CVX codes for MILP (1.35).
Parameters in CVX codes Notation in Section 1.5
N N
















B.3 CVX code for MILP (1.41)
Below is the CVX code to solve MILP (1.41). The parameters that appear in the
code are defined in Table B.3.
c vx so l v e r gurobi
cvx beg in
va r i ab l e d (N) binary
va r i ab l e c (N)
va r i ab l e p (N)
maximize ( w’ ∗ p − v ’ ∗ d )
sub j e c t to
ones (1 ,N) ∗ c <= C tota l
c >= 0
p <= Pi ’ ∗ p + e + c
p >= 0
p <= pbar




Parameters in CVX codes for MILP (1.41).












Parameters in CVX codes for MILP (1.49).









B.4 CVX code for MILP (1.49)
Below is the CVX code to solve MILP (1.49). The parameters that appear in the
code are defined in Table B.4.
c vx so l v e r mosek
cvx beg in
va r i ab l e d (N) binary % de f a u l t i n d i c a t o r
va r i ab l e c (N) % cash i n j e c t i o n vec to r
minimize ( pbar ’ ∗ diag (w) ∗ d )
sub j e c t to
ones (1 ,N) ∗ c <= C tota l ;
c >= 0 ;
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